Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 41
Issue 3 Spring

Article 1

Spring 2021

Between Backlash and the Re-Emerging “Calvo Doctrine”:
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in an Era of Socialism,
Protectionism, and Nationalism
Ylli Dautaj

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ylli Dautaj, Between Backlash and the Re-Emerging “Calvo Doctrine”: Investor-State Dispute Settlement in
an Era of Socialism, Protectionism, and Nationalism, 41 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 273 (2021).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol41/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an
authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2021 by Ylli Dautaj
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Vol. 41, No. 3

Between Backlash and the ReEmerging “Calvo Doctrine”: InvestorState Dispute Settlement in an Era of
Socialism, Protectionism, and
Nationalism
Ylli Dautaj*
Abstract:
The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) regime stands on shaky ground. Its
legitimacy is heavily questioned by critics and a “backlash debate” has ensued.
As a result, a contested and infected debate has been on-going for some years
now and multiple reform proposals have been offered, ranging from (a) moderate
(and sensible) reform proposals—e.g., increased transparency; the inclusion of
state counterclaims; the inclusion of higher ethical standards; reformulating
deference standards; applying human rights and environmental law when
interpreting international investment treaties; etc.—to more (b) radical reform
proposals—e.g., the elaboration of either an Appellate System or an Investment
Court System (ICS). Such latter proposals are radical because they seek the total
re-designing of the entire ISDS regime. It is argued that these radical proposals
ultimately seek to undercut the fundamental elements of international arbitration
in favor of a supposedly “fairer” and more “just” system. The proponents of these
“equitable” reforms seek to dismantle ISDS as we know it.
It is submitted that all reform proposals are best analyzed through the lens of the
mental representation of the stakeholders to the ISDS regime, namely, the
essential actors; service providers; value providers; and the global community at
large. But what interests should be preserved and further enhanced?
This paper makes several points, inter alia, (1) that the contemporary criticism is
not a new phenomenon and that we must emphatically reject the spill-overs of
extreme left-leaning ideology, nationalism, protectionism, idiosyncrasy,
parochialism, and populism in transnational litigation; (2) that moderate reformproposals merit attention if—and only if—those further the fundamental elements
of international arbitration, and conversely, rejected if not; (3) that the way,
shape, and form of ISDS must be analyzed through the lens of its historical and
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philosophical underpinning; and (4) that every stakeholder’s claim must be
heard, but that in the sociology of ISDS there should be a hierarchal structure
deciding the validity (or normative value) of each claim depending on the
stakeholders overall positioning in the regime.
Finally, the ISDS-reform discussions should be conducted in a manner that
underscores broader historical, economic, political, philosophical, and
sociological lessons of the project called “transnationalism,” which happens to
be a brainchild of liberal capitalism.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
It has often been said that tentative predictions about the future can be
approximated by analyzing the past with due care and attention.1 The recent
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform debate is not an anomaly in
this respect.2 The current regime was not easily established, nor has it
operated without repeated challenges to its overall legitimacy. The roots of
the contemporary criticism are not new, albeit sometimes taking new shapes
and forms. Since its inception, ideologues have attacked the regime for either
lacking legal validity, for being too investor-oriented, or for resting on a
“sovereignty deficit” and thus undercutting “public interest” concerns.3 Be
assured, the frequent, streamlined, and often analytically sound attacks will
continue to come. In fact, and even worse, post-WWII virtues will always be
under attack.4 ISDS is but another product aligned with policy objectives and
1

Kluwer Arbitration London Event, The Gary Born lecture: International Arbitration:
Recent Developments, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
MLa9KZEF92o&list=PLTkvRnnV6E6qDlzpM97q7n76xHlzwS7Kc&index=3&t=2s
[hereinafter Born] (Most scholarly work on ISDS reform worth its name—much of what is
referred to in this paper—starts with a historical account of a legal theory on international law
and transnational adjudication in the making. Gary Born rightly started a panel session on this
topic by stating that, “I would like to look backwards instead of forwards; backwards to
historical developments because I think they teach us something about possible future
trends.”).
2
See primarily the EU Commissions’ proposal of an Investment Court System (or often
called a Multilateral Investment Court) and The UNCITRAL Working Group III. Several
interest groups, so-called stakeholders in the sociology of arbitration are engaged in this
debate—many of whom will be cited in this paper.
3
See Gloria Maria Alvarez et al., A Response to the Criticism Against ISDS by EFILA,
33 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 9, 12 (2015) (“Critics have raised concerns about the pro-investor
interpretation of investment treaty provisions and their perceived unpredictability, the alleged
lack of transparency of arbitral proceedings, the alleged lack of independence and impartiality
of arbitrators. Others have suggested that ISDS bypasses the operation of domestic law and
national courts and stymies the right of states to regulate. Criticisms have also been raised
against the investor-state arbitration process itself, claiming that it allows partisan, selfinterested arbitrators to secretly overrule governments with no right of appeal.”); See JAMES
H CARTER, The Culture of Arbitration and the Defense of Arbitral Legitimacy, in PRACTISING
VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 97–105 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015);
Stephan W. Schill, Conceptions of Legitimacy of International Arbitration, in PRACTISING
VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 106–24 ((David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Schill, Conceptions]. See Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual Framework and Options for the Way Forward, E15
INITIATIVE, ICTSD & WORLD ECON. FORUM I 1 (2015) [hereinafter Schill, Reforming]
(“Recurring concerns involve inconsistencies in decision making, insufficient regard by some
arbitral tribunals to the host state’s right to regulate in interpreting IIAs, charges of bias of the
system in favor of foreign investors, concerns about the lack of independence and impartiality
of arbitrators, limited mechanisms to control arbitral tribunals and ensure correctness of their
decisions, and increasing costs for the resolution of investment disputes.”). See CHESTER
BROWN & KATE MILES, Introduction: Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and
Arbitration, EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 3, 3-4 (2011).
4
These critics actually try to undercut the praising of success and individualism. In fact,
some states have been more successful than others in political theory; in fact, some ideas have
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political concerns of a free and open market system. Thus, the roots of the
criticism are rather to be found in political theory, i.e., in the critics’
misinformed mental representation that considers the role of the individual
as inferior to the superior objectives of the state. Left-leaning ideology,
nationalism, protectionism, and populism will continue to feature as go-to
doctrines wherever and whenever there are widespread fear and demagogy
in conjunction with distressed and dissatisfied people. Engaging in blamegames and moral grandstanding is big business. Some participants end up in
well-paid and comfortable political positions, others in NGOs, and some, I
guess, as tenured professors.5
The opponents to ISDS initially attacked the regime ab initio, but
nowadays they level more measured criticism; the attack is intelligently
presented in nuance, scope, and degree.6 The critics streamline their concerns
proved more successful than others; in fact, some ideologies have proved more successful than
others; and so on and so forth. When one shies away from this, the underlying premises for
any political, economic, or legal reform debate become based on flawed analysis and halfcooked logic. This symptom—i.e., postmodernism, a form of neo-Marxism—is seen all over
the world in contemporary politics and has naturally spilled over into the domain of
international arbitration. The critics that adhere to this worldview (intentionally or
unintentionally and mostly well intended) will first grasp for low-hanging fruit; that is, level
an attack first on ISDS, and then move on to international commercial arbitration, too. In this
paper, I focus on arbitration but meanwhile, I am aware that the symptom has a root cause that
goes much deeper than to arbitration critics. Moreover, I also seek to articulate the crucial
need for young practitioners and scholars to study the philosophy and sociology of arbitration
in conjunction with the technical “legal” solutions to complex “legal” problems. For any
arbitration scholar, the work of Emmanuel Gaillard should serve as a guiding star. See
EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2012) [hereinafter
GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY]; see also Emmanuel Gaillard, Sociology of International
Arbitration, PRACTISING VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 187-88 (David D.
Caron et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Gaillard, Sociology]. Moreover, we urge the young (and
now very young) arbitration practitioners to analyze human behavior also through the lens of
the market, social norms, and architecture.
5
See Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 107 (“Problems with, or even the lack of,
legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration are frequently diagnosed by critical scholars, nongovernmental organizations, politicians, and governments[.]”). See also Daniele Gallo &
Fernanda G. Nicola, The External Dimension of EU Investment Law: Jurisdictional Clashes
and Transformative Adjudication, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1081, 1087 (2016) (The investment
court proposal in the European Union’s investment chapters “was a response to the criticism
expressed by the European Parliament, civil society, some Member States and their national
parliament alike distrusting the current international arbitration regimes for lack of democratic
accountability, consistency, openness and independence[.]”); Charles N. Brower & Sadie
Blanchard, From ‘Dealing in Virtue’ to ‘Profiting from Injustice’: The Case Against ‘ReStatification’ of Investment Dispute Settlement, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. ONLINE 45 (2014) (“Over
the next decade and a half, opposition to arbitration developed, predominantly from leftist
academics, anti-globalization groups, and States that found themselves as respondents in
investment treaty arbitrations.”).
6
Many still believe that arbitration of public interests should not be arbitrable. See, e.g.,
Ruth Teitelbaum, A Look at the Public Interest in Investment Arbitration: Is it Unique? What
Should We Do About It?, 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 54 (2010). Many NGOs that critique the
contemporary set-up of ISDS do in fact not trust the regime at all and would dismantle its
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to (1) whether the substantive protection in international investment
agreements (IIAs) is too heavily favoring investors, and (2) whether
arbitrators are in a position to render fairness and justice in matters
implicating public policy or interest; in other words, critics ask whether ISDS
is a legitimate legal institution. Anyone seeking to attack the ISDS regime
per se must start at the back-end and move upwards; that is, first, question
the procedural legitimacy of ISDS; second, question the substantive
legitimacy in IIAs; and finally, question the very existence of ISDS
altogether and the current design of IIAs.7 Thus, going forward, it will be
important that the users of the regime make their voices heard before it is too
late to stop the critics from, first, de-legitimizing the regime, and then,
ultimately, orchestrating the dismantling of it.8 In this paper, I wish to put
forth the wisdom in practical experience. This paper will inform the reader
about the differences in a pre- and post-WWII era and their interrelation with
international arbitration.
But we must start from the premise that there is nothing unique nor
novel in the contemporary criticism, and therefore that there is not
necessarily a need to address the core of the critique with novel solutions.
Rather, we seek to once again elevate workability to the highest standing in
transnational adjudication and to increase the currency of private
adjudication, namely, the role of the state as a private party, subject to private
law. At the end of the day, concepts such as pacta sunt servanda, bona fide
negotiation, and party autonomy hold eternal wisdom as concepts that
strengthen the rule of law and are, furthermore, to be treated as fundamental
existence in total. In their view it lacks legitimacy ab initio.
7
See, e.g., the remarks of two proponents of the ICS system and conversely opponents
of the current ISDS regime: Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1151 (“The open question
remains, however, whether beyond such procedural innovation also substantive aspirations lie
behind the agenda of EU trade negotiators to promote a truly transformative trade and
investment regime in their recently negotiated FTAs, rather than simply responding to external
and internal political and legal pressures. While the transformative procedural architecture of
the ICS is well established, we question whether its substantive clauses on the right to regulate
and fair and equitable treatment are well-equipped to engage with emerging questions of
corporate social responsibility, sustainable development and human rights arising in
international investment disputes.”).
8
See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 3, at 103 (“[c]hallengers raise a number of issues,
including whether investors should be allowed to use an arbitration mechanism at all, rather
than the courts of the host state […] .”). See Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1082 (“we
propose greater engagement with State-to-State arbitration and further substantive reforms for
a truly transformative adjudication system addressing global inequalities created by the current
investment regime.”). It should be mentioned that the authors are in favor of including an
investment protection regime as opposed to subjecting the investor to state-to-state arbitration
and national courts’ jurisdiction. They make the point that the ICS strikes this balance.
However, I argue that an MIC and a de-politicized investment protection regime are mutually
exclusive. The MIC proposal is inherently political. Moreover, to complement that regime
with state-to-state arbitration and substantive reforms would dismantle the little that is left of
the international arbitration element of the regime.
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values in a liberal democratic and rules-based society.9 That said, some
reform proposals deserve merit and attention because “[t]he ISDS system
needs to continue to evolve to reflect lessons learned by states, investors, and
other stakeholders from the last 30 years of experience and cases resolved
under this system.”10 We must assess and address issues such as increased
transparency, ethical standards of arbitrators and counsel, arbitrator
intelligence, amicus participation, human rights concerns, environmental
concerns, investor obligations in IIAs, etc. But other reform proposals do not
merit equal attention nor appreciation, such as the establishment of a
multilateral investment court or an appellate body.11
In an era of extreme sensitivity and academic curtailing, this paper is
consciously written without cowering down a single inch to praising—to a
great extent, idolizing—the achievements made by liberal democracies that
have embraced a rules-based international legal order and a market-economy,
i.e., the free and open market system. Virtues transcending socialism,
nationalism, protectionism, populism, idiosyncrasy, and parochialism should
be praised wherever the opportunity is given. ISDS is a perfect manifestation
of this post-WWII and post-Cold War success.12 And while the regime should
be scrutinized for its betterment, it should not too readily be criticized without
first entertaining a historical account of its coming about. The ISDS
community should be careful in pouring too much new wine in old bottles,
else the bottles break, the wine runs out, and the bottles perish.13
Hence, I am not really engaging exclusively in a technical discussion
9
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., The Core Values of Arbitration, ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA 3, 4–5 (2006), quoted in Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 117-18 (“In a
democratic society, party autonomy should be the fundamental value that shapes arbitration.
The personal autonomy inherent in arbitration constitutes a dominant policy in all areas of a
democracy. The freedom to select arbitration procedure is a choice that one anticipates should
exist in a state that values personal autonomy. Arbitration liberty is achieved by making party
autonomy the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values. Viewed in this light, the
important value of party autonomy is directly related to the freedom essential in a democratic
state. A strong version of arbitration party autonomy exemplifies the significance of freedom
of contract. In a state such as ours characterized by the respect for individual liberty, courts
should enforce customized agreements to arbitrate and the legislature should regulate
minimally. In a society governed by rules of the free market, contract norms that guide
exchanges are necessarily based on autonomous action of individual economic actors.”).
10 CORP. COUNSEL INT’L ARBITRATION GRP. (CCIAG), Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) Reform, 15 (2019), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/cciag_isds_
reform.pdf.
11 For a good outline of how each is structured by two proponents of an ICS, see Marc
Bungenberg & August Reinisch, From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment Courts to
a Multilateral Investment Court, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. (2018).
12 See Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights, PRACTISING
VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17, 17 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015) (“The
post-Second World War economic expansion is widely recognized as a period of economic
prosperity which occurred in the mid-twentieth century following the end of the Second World
War in 1945.”).
13 Mathew 9:17.
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and analysis on “perfecting” the procedural features of ISDS. I believe that
the radical reform proposals and the systematic attacks on ISDS’s legitimacy
is seeking to step-by-step—intentionally or unintentionally—undercut the
core values, objectives, and virtues of international arbitration—e.g., access
to a neutral independent dispute settlement; cost and speed efficiency; a level
playing field between investors and host-states; party autonomy; a large pool
of qualified expert arbitrators; finality and enforceability; etc.14 Thus, apart
from the technicality of the reform-proposals, we must engage in a debate on
ISDS’s role in legal civilization and the philosophical positioning and
standing it actually has as a manifestation of the free and open market.15
I do not believe that the ISDS regime is under an “existential threat” per
se. The roots of the contemporary criticism is a disease that is cyclical and
swings like a pendulum back and forth. Put differently, much of the criticism
can be considered a breeze of not-so-fresh-air. However, the years of damage
that can be done by entertaining parts of the criticism will definitely hit the
backbone of any free society, namely, its small and medium enterprises.
Conversely, major players will always be positioned to negotiate for ISDS
protection in their investor-state contracts.16 Thus, the damage that can be
done, generally, and for small and medium enterprises, in particular, can
never be justified, and hence the ISDS-reform discussions should be
conducted in a manner that underscores broader historical, economic,
political, philosophical, and sociological lessons of the project called
“transnationalism,” which is a brainchild of liberal capitalism.17

14

For a good contribution to the UNCITRAL Working Group III of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Reform, see CCIAG, supra note 10.
15 Gaillard, Sociology, supra note 4, at 188 (“It is somewhat difficult for lawyers to
distance themselves from legal rules and procedures—and all the controversies we enjoy
discussing in arbitration circles—to take a step back and look at arbitration as a social
phenomenon, with its actors, their social behaviour, and their interactions.”). Thus, this paper
will emphasize why international arbitration—including ISDS—was established, what did it
contribute with, and whether there have been any serious alternatives. For example, ICSID is
a product of a multilateral initiative through the World Bank. This initiative had at its core
post-war recovery. This is a legacy of Post-WWII virtues that transcends nationalism and
seeks to contribute to peace through economic development, interconnectivity, and
interdependence. See Part III for more.
16 See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Politics, Reason, and the Trajectory of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 271, 295 (2017) (“Large multinational investors may
not like the EU’s vision, but seem unlikely to oppose it, in part because investment treaties do
not rank high on their list of institutional concerns, and in part because multinational
enterprises have other options in managing disputes with host states. Small- and medium-size
investors might oppose the EU’s proposal for an investment court, but lack the political capital
to influence treaty negotiations.”) (footnotes omitted).
17 A valid counterargument would be that an Investment Advisory Centre (IAC) would
be established as an independent organ to support small and medium enterprises and
developing countries in connection with an ICS procedure. See BUNGENBERG, supra note 11,
at 3.
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II. POST-WAR VIRTUES: TRANSCENDING PROTECTIONISM
AND NATIONALISM THROUGH LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES
AND THE FREE AND OPEN MARKET
I argue that apart from the conceptualization of a “social contract,” the
creation of liberal democracies embracing the free and open market has
represented the greatest achievement and success in political theory.18 In a
relatively short time span following the world wars and the Cold War, liberal
capitalist policies and initiatives stemming from such have lifted millions of
people out of poverty by inter alia leading to unexpected heights of
technological innovation and an increased frequency (and value) of crossborder goods and services. The core philosophical features of the western
capitalist world-view have been a broad conceptual understanding of
individual freedom, ease of doing business, and the protection of human
rights. This mental representation of the world resonates with merchants
seeking to improve their positioning. In this competitive environment,
traditional barriers of culture, religion, race, etc. were obstacles to one’s own
improvement. Highlighting the early transborder movement of merchants,
Professor Carbonneau wrote that:
Desisting from political wrangles was the first characteristic of the
nascent merchant class. Additionally, it was transborder in character.
The centers of European commerce reached out to one another and to
the existing global marketplace. Capitalism, almost intrinsically, had
an international reach. The betterment of self and station had universal
appeal. Political boundaries were not a significant or limiting factor
to the enterprise. Although the commercial centers competed for
international business, they also reinforced each other in selfinterested cooperation. Everyone who contributed to the transaction
could share in the profits it yielded. Commercial values were defined
and prevailed. The private agreement was the primary source of
regulation.19

As a result, the world became a more united, liberal, and progressive
place. Trust, confidence, and harmony had received a heightened standing
and interdependence and interconnectivity and increased currency. This is all
18

Commonly called “liberal capitalism.” RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 10 (2012) (“[E]conomic
literature has emphasized that openness of an economic system to foreign competition is
among the factors that contribute to economic growth and to good governance in general.
Thus, investment law embodies and represents the nature and the effects of economic
globalization, with the potential advantage of economic efficiency and of a higher standard
coupled with a reduced legal power of the national authorities to regulate such areas that have
an impact upon foreign investment.”).
19 Extract from Thomas E. Carbonneau, Commercial Peace and Political Competition in
the Crosshairs of International Arbitration, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 311 (2008), but
reprinted in THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED ESSAYS (2011).
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manifested in—and became further entrenched by—globalization.20 Chief
Justice Menon analyzed this post-war development and the need for a
harmonized legal framework to facilitate the new world order.21 He wrote
that:
At the same time, the rebuilding and reconstruction of the post-war
world created both the impetus and the opportunity to focus on
development and economic growth. So even as the number of discrete
states and polities increased, the world witnessed a rapid increase in
the connectedness of its economies and cultures. Thomas Friedman
observed in his international bestseller, The World is Flat, what might
now be accepted as conventional wisdom: that increased connectivity
has resulted in the accelerated flattening of the world, facilitating the
phenomenon of globalization. But globalization occasions the need
for a more homogenous and harmonized legal framework that can
accommodate the vast increase in economic relationships which
crosses borders that might not previously have existed or been quite
so firm.22

In this respect, international arbitration has been playing an intrinsic part
in providing for a more homogenous and harmonized legal framework to
accommodate cross-border bargains. International arbitration helped provide
for an artificial element of trust and thus ipso facto facilitated the
transcending of barriers of all sorts, e.g., cultural, religious, economic,
political, legal, and philosophical.23 But even more and like in other aspects
of life, international arbitration displays something more fundamental about
human nature, namely, the desire for autonomy, freedom, and liberty.24
But not all perceive international arbitration as a unifying legal
framework and, because of its transnational nature, the “pluralistic structure
20 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 1 (2009) (Globalization has been described as “one of the formative processes which
affects today’s cultural, political, and economic life virtually anywhere in the world, is
gradually transforming international law from a simple tool to coordinate inter-State relations
to an instrument that provides a legal structure for truly global social orders.”).
21 See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 83 (1905) (“And the more
important international economic interests grow, the more International Law will grow.”).
22 Menon, supra note 12, at 17; See also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2006).
23 See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 477 (2009) (“Dispute
settlement has a central function in stabilizing the expectations of foreign investors and
enables them to counter opportunistic behavior by the host state, such as unreasonable
interferences with the investor’s economic rights or even expropriations without
compensation. Recourse to a dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism empowers the
investor to effectively hold states liable for breaches of their promises in investment treaties
to not expropriate foreign investors without compensation, to treat them fairly and equitably,
to provide full protection and security, and so on.”).
24 See Born, supra note 1.
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of international arbitration complicates the search for a unifying legal
framework in which legality can be equated with legitimacy, as is
traditionally done by lawyers.”25 Thus, critics often misconceive this unique
and challenging feature as being a “con” or obstacle of international
arbitration. Often, they compare the legitimacy of the regime with a false
notion of a municipal legal order that supposedly protects due process and
the public interest while rendering fair, just, correct, and consistent
outcomes.26
International arbitration is a perfect manifestation of globalization gone
right. It represents a successful experiment in both investment treaties and
commercial dispute resolutions. Relative trust when entering international
dealings is facilitated by a transnational dispute resolution system that is
underpinned inter alia by party autonomy, available arbitrator expertise,
procedural flexibility, finality, and enforceability. But mostly, the success of
international arbitration is a direct result of removing justice from the realm
of biased or cumbersome court procedures. It allows parties to operate
globally without the fear of being dragged into a foreign court. ISDS
promotes economic cooperation by allowing parties to trust each other with
their private capital; in other words, the regime has elaborated an atmosphere
of confidence.27
Because arbitration is a specie of party autonomy, private citizens are
free to order their affairs as they see fit. Allowing private individuals to enter
into agreements in good faith and then obey the terms (pacta sunt servanda)
is the backbone that facilitates a private ordering in the context of a market
economy system. When a state assumes private capacity and enters dealings
in matters of trade, commerce, and investment, it too should be held
accountable to the terms of the bargain. This idea has been predominant in a
post-WWII global landscape. Apart from international commercial
arbitration (ICA), investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has facilitated a
huge flow of capital and has, furthermore, helped de-politicize investment
25

Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 108.
See, e.g., Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1151 (“EU trade negotiators have changed
the international architecture for the protection of foreign investors through by moving away
from a traditional ISDS model and adopting instead a permanent court system with procedural
due process guarantees: the ICS.”).
27 See ICSID REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE ICSID CONVENTION, para. 9
(1965), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section03.htm
(“The creation of an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes between States
and foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private international capital into those
countries which wish to attract it.”). This report was also discussed by Judge Brower in Brower
& Blanchard, supra note 5, at 48-49 (“Thus, States sought to create an independent, neutral
forum with clear rules to enhance trust and encourage foreign investment. To further induce
international capital flows for economic development, States proceeded to conclude thousands
of bilateral and multilateral investment protection and promotion treaties, which guarantee
certain standards of treatment to alien investors.”).
26
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disputes. It removed dispute resolution from the realm of diplomatic
protection and state-to-state arbitration. Investors trust IIAs to offer sufficient
substantive protection as well as ISDS to guarantee a procedural venue for
redress. In this context, the state is a private party; no more and no less.
Signatories to IIAs have not elaborated a robust international investment
law out of nicety, but rather out of necessity. The driving force behind IIAs
is to promote a friendly investment climate and eventually attract foreign
direct investment (FDI). Investors may be discouraged from making an
investment—or if already established, further investments—if treaty
provisions are not honored.28 The ISDS regime reinstates trust in the system
by allowing investors to redress their grievances in a neutral forum. In short,
a host state promises to protect the investor and her investment and if things
go wrong, the party can at least trust the reliable dispute settlement
mechanism to uphold the rule of law. This is crucial because FDI helps to
facilitate and promote sustainable development and economic growth. “[T]he
principle of sustainable development requires understanding investment law
not as an obstacle to development but as a tool for host states to achieve their
economic development objectives[.]”29
The bottom line is this: by providing for a neutral dispute resolution
forum, international arbitration promotes and facilitates both
interdependence and interconnectivity by enhanced cross-border trade,
commerce, and investment.30 For these combined reasons, the arbitral
doctrine promulgated in the West should be strenuously praised.
International arbitration is not perfect, but because the idea works, the dispute
resolution regime represents quite a triumph in legal civilization.31 ISDS is
but one manifestation of international arbitration and is in that light no
exception in representing a triumph in legal civilization.
III. WAR, PEACE, AND DIPLOMACY: INVESTMENT LAW AND
ISDS IN THE MAKING OR BREAKING?
The starting point of multilateral efforts to achieve peace and crossborder cooperation was the coming together at the Peace of Westphalia,
28 ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 607
(2018).
29 Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 5.
30 See Clint Peinhardt & Todd Allee, Devil in the Details? The Investment Effects of
Dispute Settlement Variation in BITs, in Y.B. ON INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2010-2011, at 833
(Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012). There are plenty of studies suggesting otherwise, namely, that
ISDS clauses have not been a major factor in promoting and attracting FDI.
31 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 773 (2002); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing
the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193 (2001);
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, CARBONNEAU
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 66-67 (2011) (“Arbitration, in fact, has
been so triumphant that it has spawned a professional culture of its own.”); see also
Gaillard, Sociology, supra note 4, at 187-203.
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where two treaties were produced.32 The diplomatic congresses ended with
the Congress of Vienna in which the Napoleonic wars ended and a
sophisticated multilateral system of political and economic cooperation
started in Europe and has since been spread to almost all parts of the world.33
Since then, much has happened. First, in 1920, there was the attempt to
establish a League of Nations, which was established but stranded due to
world wars. Later missions of regional and multilateral cooperation through
the United Nations, the European Union, the North American Free Trade
Association, BRICS, etc. were successfully established. These are all
testaments to States’ efforts and willingness to bring about peace, economic
development, and monetary stability.
Thus, it was not until the early 1900s that the efforts of an
internationalized political order was taken seriously, and was nearly
established but for WWI and WWII.34 Post-WWII, the world community
once again started a slow but steady recovery period and kept true to the
desire and mission of preventing further chaos through interdependence and
economic prosperity by multilateralism.35 Thus, following WWII and
decolonialization, “numerous multilateral approaches were taken to develop
the substance of international economic law systematically and in a more
universally agreeable manner[.]”36 These efforts were accelerated post-Cold
War. These approaches are best manifested by two events: (1) the
establishing of UN (and the ICJ), and (2) the Washington Consensus.37 In
light of the previous backlash against FDI regulation (let alone ISDS) from
the 1970s, the Washington Consensus represented an abrupt change in policy
objectives of a multilateral platform.38 Professors Dolzer and Schreuer
eloquently explained the impact of the Washington Consensus in the
32 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN A
NUTSHELL 17 (2019). An interesting note is that the proclaimed doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda was adopted and embraced in the deliberations.
33 Id.
34 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 1.
35 E.g., the purpose of the World Bank was to assist in post-war reconstruction and
facilitate economic development in third-world and developing jurisdictions. The convention
that came to be called the ICSID Convention came into force on October 14, 1966 and did not
include any international investment law, but focused rather on the elaboration of an
adjudicatory framework.
36 Menon, supra note 12, at 28.
37 Prateek
Agarwal, Washington Consensus, INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST (2020),
https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/washington-consensus/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2020)
(“The Washington Consensus refers to a set of free-market economic policies supported
prominent financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the U.S. Treasury. A British economist named John Williamson coined the term
Washington Consensus in 1989. The ideas were intended to help developing countries that
faced economic crises. In summary, The Washington Consensus recommended structural
reforms that increased the role of market forces in exchange for immediate financial help.
Some examples include free-floating exchange rates and free trade.”).
38 See more in III.A. below.
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following manner:
At the same time, international financial institutions revised their
position on the role of private instrument, and the so-called
Washington Consensus, with its new emphasis on the private sector
in the process of development, summarized the foundation for the now
dominant approach to development and its concomitant positive view
of private foreign investment. In 1992, the new approach crystallized
in the Preamble of the World Bank’s Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment. It recognizes “that a greater flow of
foreign direct investment brings substantial benefits to bear on the
world economy and on the economies of developing countries in
particular, in terms of improving the long-term efficiency of the host
country through greater competition, transfer of capital, technology
and managerial skills and enhancement of market access and in terms
of the expansion of international trade.” Within this new climate of
international economic relations, the fight of previous decades
against customary rules protecting foreign investment had abruptly
become anachronistic and obsolete.39

This new climate of international economic relations moved the debate
from whether FDI should be protected to how it should be protected.40 The
proliferation of IIAs and transborder investment flows was a natural result of
an increased globalization following the end of the Cold War.41
In fact, ISDS as a regime had been elaborated already in the 1960s but
came to receive a serious push in the 1990s whereby the caseload of the
ICSID increased significantly.42 States started concluding IIAs with ISDS
39 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 15-16; Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign
Direct Investment, 7 ICSID REVIEW 297–306 (1992).
40 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) had started
work on a multilateral treaty protecting foreign investment. This was followed by the AbsShawcross Convention but again did not get enough traction. The World Bank was finally
more successful when they initiated the groundwork that came to be the ICSID Convention.
41 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 472.
42 In 1972 the first case was registered. As a matter of fact, it was the only case registered
that year. Between 1972-1996 there was an average yearly caseload between 0-4 cases. The
increase in caseload increased gradually in 1997 with 10 registered cases and kept going
upwards. The highest number recorded was in 2018 with 56 registered cases. In 2019 there
was a substantial decrease from previous four years with 39 registered cases. “International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload Statistics, Issue 2020-1, 7
(the registered cases for 2015-2018 was 52, 48, 53, and 56, respectively).” International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload Statistics, Issue 2020-1. See also
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 19 (“In 1961 already, two years after the era of
bilateral treaties had begun, the World Bank took the lead among the international economic
organizations to address the emerging international legal framework of foreign investment,
pointing to its mandate and to the link between economic development, international
cooperation, and the role of private international investment.”); For a good take on the
groundwork of the ICSID Convention, see Aron Broches, Convention On The Settlement Of
Investment Disputes Between States And Nationals Of Other States, 1965, in SELECTED
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clauses on a routine basis. The ensuing debates instead centered around the
interpretation of these treaties. In this light, ISDS of treaty disputes became
a field of its own (investment treaty arbitration, or “ITA”). These turnouts
helped establish a favorable jurisdiction for FDI, on the one hand, and
emphatically depoliticized the investment dispute framework, on the other.43
In a word, it was understood that “[a]ccess to strong investment protections
combined with effective ISDS helps avert . . . suboptimal outcomes [for
investors].”44
The initial politicization of dispute resolution through, for example,
diplomatic protection was not to anyone’s satisfaction. Particularly smalland medium-sized enterprises were left with little recourse—”save what their
government care[d] to give them after weighing the diplomatic pros and cons
of bringing a particular claim.”45 This was obviously an unsustainable
situation. In this light ISDS was born and should be praised as a great invent
and achievement in legal civilization.46
ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 188, 195-96 (1995).
43 See I. F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1 (1986); P. Lalive, Some Threats to International
Investment Arbitration, 1 ICSID REV. 26–40 (1986). See also Schill, Reforming, supra note 3,
at 1 (“Recourse to international arbitration has been celebrated as depoliticizing investment
disputes and contributing to enhancing the rule of law in investor-state relations.”). See Brower
& Blanchard, supra note 5, at 46-47 (“States created the [ICSID] and committed to other
neutral arbitration fora for resolving foreign investment disputes precisely to remove such
disputes from earlier politicized means of settlement, such as international diplomacy and
potentially volatile domestic processes, because politicization inhibited capital flows essential
to economic development.”). See Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 477 (“Indeed, without
the investor having the option of recourse to arbitration, investment treaties would be mere
political declarations (albeit with some implications on the diplomatic level) instead of a set
of rules enforceable against states.”). Finally, see Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice and Loyalty
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 317 (2014). ISDS was in fact absent
in the early IIAs, which referred instead to state-to-state dispute settlement or the ICJ—i.e., a
more institutionalized and entirely state-centric venue for dispute settlement.
44 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 2.
45 REDFERN, supra note 28, at 443, citing congressional testimony of Dan Price. For a
discussion on the effect on small and medium investors as opposed to multinational
corporations vis-á-vis EU’s proposed ICS, see Brower, supra note 16, at 300 (“For
multinational corporations involved in large investment projects, that remains a live option,
meaning that they can vote with their feet. That, in turn, would transform the proposed
investment court into a small claims court reserved only for small- and medium-sized
investors, while the real action involving the big players and points of principle takes place
elsewhere.”). See also Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 481-82.
46 REDFERN, supra note 28, at 443, citing congressional testimony of Dan Price. See also
Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 1 (“From the perspective of foreign investors, investment
treaty arbitration, which is offered in addition to,
or as an alternative for, the host state’s domestic courts, has been successful in making host
states comply with their IIA obligations in an effective, neutral, and independent forum for
the settlement of investment disputes. In particular, in countries with weak government and
judicial institutions, ISDS is considered to be a crucial safeguard to allow foreign investors to
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The critics of strong investment protection and ISDS need to follow a
specific order if they wish to succeed in dismantling the regime; that is, first
initiate a heated debate on solutions to allegedly fundamental issues (defined
by the critics), which is then followed by a new or “better” structure or
interpretation (e.g. aligning IIAs or the ISDS procedure with specific public
interest considerations). When they are successful in amplifying procedural
and substantive features that “make sense” by supposedly addressing the
“legitimacy concerns,” the regime will be so far from its equilibrium state
that it will be shaky, unstable, and perform so poorly that a justification for a
total transformation or even rejection is a message easily conveyed. This is,
indeed, the real mission of the philosophically sound and ideologically
adverse critics. That said, one cannot refrain from applauding how well they
are orchestrating this hit-job on one of the greatest achievements in legal
civilization.
However, even if critics are noisy, loud, and organized at the moment,
the free and open market system speaks volumes. As always, the international
political order needs to adapt to the desires of successful entrepreneurs and
profit-seeking individualism. The synergy effects of economic prosperity and
peace through reciprocal individualism have been unmatched—no
alternative is a serious contender. The contemporary international, political,
and economic order will ultimately prevail because it actually works. But for
the international economic order to function effectively, entrepreneurs need
to trust each other. To facilitate trust in international cooperation and
transnational commercial dealings, the surging commercial class demands
both substantive protection and a neutral venue in which to redress their
grievances. Accordingly, it is an absolute necessity to make informed
decisions based on facts rather than myths.47
A. Rejecting Gunboat Diplomacy and Diplomatic Protection: ISDS’s Role
in Legal Civilization
Inflow of private capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI)
is fundamental for the survival of most economies and is more generally an
integral part of an increasingly interdependent world.48 In other words, “[t]he
sanction illegitimate government conduct, such as arbitrary conduct or expropriations without
compensation, without needing to be subject to the vagaries of litigating against the host
government in its own courts. In addition, direct recourse to ISDS replaces the otherwise
available mechanism for the investor’s home state to exercise diplomatic protection, thus
preventing an investor-state dispute from becoming a diplomatic incident that can strain intergovernmental relations.”) [referring to O. Thomas Johnson and Jonathan Gimblett, From
Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, Y.B. ON INT’L INV.
L. & POL’Y 649 (2010–2011)].
47 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 41.
48 FDI was slow before and after the world wars until the 1990s where an outburst of FDI
was seen. Following that, IIAs came about. Naturally, these came to include ISDS clauses.
See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 1. FDI constitutes 38% of global GDP. See
CCIAG, supra note 10, at 1 [referring to Regional Fact Sheet: Developed Economies,
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inflow of capital is essential for the growth of the economy, the provision of
infrastructure, and continued economic development in the receiving
country.”49 Self-interest in profit has the potential to put bias, suspicion, hate,
and fear to a secondary role by instead elevating profits to a primary
positioning. This positioning gets firmly entrenched only where there is a
legal framework competent to handle disputes in an orderly fashion. IIA
allows the surging commercial class to take risks in seeking profits without
being overly cautious of, inter alia, political and legal barriers. For example,
IIAs with ISDS clauses help redress grievances of investors for possible
breaches of their investments because of, for example, unforeseen,
unreasonable, or unjustified regulatory changes rendering the investment
worthless.50 In this context, international arbitration has “made global
business possible between Western parties and emerging States and countries
that embrace different ideological and legal traditions.”51 In order to maintain
the benefits of FDI—e.g., global economic growth and public welfare—
”governments need to take proactive steps to cultivate an environment
conducive to foreign investment, including ensuring access to neutral,
independent dispute settlement procedures.”52
For those reasons, investors enjoy substantive protection for their
investments. Thus, international investment law offered through a system of
and a push for IIAs—with the procedural venue for redress through ISDS—
is a perfect manifestation of accommodating political concerns and doing
justice to reasonable policy objectives in a globalized world.53 It is a move
away from a state-centric approach and a push for international intercourse
through private ordering. Interdependence among culturally, politically,
legally, and economically different nations was once a distant dream. With
the invent of reliable cross-border protection, the dream became reality. This
movement towards multilateralism—i.e., a new international economic order
based on liberal capitalism—has elaborated a form of artificial trust in crossUNCTAD World Investment Report (2019). https://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/
WIR2019/wir19_fs_dvd_en.pdf].
49 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 1.
50 This does not mean any unforeseen change, the criteria to satisfy indirect expropriation
or fair and equitable treatment is rather rigorous. However, as a reasonable addition to the
contemporary practice of ISDS adjudication, arbitrators could strengthen the role of balancing
or proportionality tests in ISDS practice. For brief remarks on this point, see Brower & Schill,
supra note 23, at 484. For lengthy analysis of its current and future use in ISDS adjudication,
see
Gebhard
Bücheler, Investor–State
Arbitration
and
the
Argentine
Cases, PROPORTIONALITY
INVESTOR-STATE
ARB. 6
(2015)
and
Valentina
Vadi, Proportionality, Reasonableness and Standards of Review in International Investment
Law and Arbitration, ELGAR INT’L INV. L. SERIES (2018).
51 Carbonneau, supra note 19, at 108.
52 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 1.
53 International investment law “consists of layers of general law, of general standards of
international economic law, and of distinct rules peculiar to its domain.” DOLZER & SCHREUER,
supra note 18, at 1.
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border bargains. Confidence in the future conduct of the contracting parties
lies at the heart of every investment decision, and reliable dispute settlement
facilitates the exchange of mutual trust.54 Cross-border cooperation, in turn,
leads to integration of markets and the limited role and need for states to
appear as “peace brokers.” Because global merchants can remedy investment
disputes in a neutral forum, a transnational rule of law has developed and is
protected by independent and impartial arbiters.55
Thus, IIAs with ISDS, like international commercial arbitration, has
helped transcend nationalism, populism, idiosyncrasy, and parochialism in
international business. It allows parties to opt for a neutral dispute resolution
forum of which the product is final, binding, and directly enforceable. Chief
Justice Menon described this well, namely:
The rise in transnational contractual arrangements inevitably spawned
a corresponding increase in disputes between parties from different
jurisdictions and this gave rise to calls for a dispute resolution system
that had at least two primary characteristics. First, there had to be a
neutral forum for the resolution of disputes, so as to minimise the
concern that disputes would be resolved in the unfamiliar judicial and
legal terrain of a foreign land. Second, decisions had to be clothed
with cross-border enforceability.56

International arbitration provides market participants with a workable
international adjudicatory system that provides for reasonable fairness,
relative uniformity, some clarity, and sufficient foreseeability. As a result,
international arbitration facilitates a reliable and robust global legal order.
Incidentally, this FDI-friendly framework is also stimulating economic
cooperation and economic growth. Private justice has by all standards
represented a success in the spirit of and tailored to the free and open market
system.
Much of the remedial success vis-á-vis ICA was eventually sought after
when dealing with sovereign states. Due to the nature of ISDS, this was not
an easy or straightforward task. Professor Hobér eloquently noted that:
It goes without saying that many problems and issues in State
54

See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 6.
Because the standing of arbitrators has been challenged (primarily by the EU in the ICS
proposal), it is important to point out that there is no evidence to prove that the current
international arbitration framework is not able to manage arbitrator ethics and professional
responsibility (e.g., through rigorous disclosure mechanisms). Moreover, the arbitral
community keeps checks and balances on each other by internal and external scrutiny and
possible reputational damage. See Brower, supra note 16, at 317 (“Assuming that partyappointed arbitrators act strategically and think long-term about their own professional
welfare, one would expect them to avoid behavior that might imperil the continuation of
investor-state arbitration as an institution. For this reason, party-appointed arbitrators have a
vested, strategic, and long-term interest in not acting like politicians.”).
56 Menon, supra note 12, at 23-24.
55
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arbitrations are similar to those that arise in private commercial
arbitration. On the other hand, it is equally clear that arbitrations
involving States do present certain distinctive features, primarily as a
result of the simple fact that one of the parties is a State, or a State
entity, rather than a commercial enterprise.57

However, ISDS or ITA did subsequently reconcile sovereign dignity
with private commercial realities by providing investors and states with a
neutral venue in which to achieve transactional fairness and accountability.58
In exchange for a workable dispute settlement regime, states are requested to
reassess and redraw the function of their courts with respect to enforcing
arbitral agreements and arbitral awards. States are also requested to
reconsider the notion of sovereignty during the procedure and at the frontand back-ends. Professor Carbonneau noted that:
Sovereignty can no longer be a cloak under which the selfish misdeeds
of the state are sheltered. In the transborder trade context, states are
fully accountable for their conduct, even their regulatory conduct,
when sovereignty falsifies the unimpeded exchange of goods and
services. The accountability of state governments for the impact of
their conduct upon international trade is nothing less than an enabling
revolution for the advocates of international unity, harmony, and
progress.59

It is expected that municipal courts abjure some fundamental values that
govern their legal systems in order to opt into this great remedial success and
strengthen the national legitimacy of ISDS. International arbitration has been
reasonable in its means and magical in its ends. The success is undeniable.
Furthermore, the fact that the system is very attractive to foreign
investors as compared to other forms of international adjudication is
unquestionable. The adjudicatory systems of ICA and ISDS/ITA have
contributed to legal civilization in an unparalleled manner. ISDS provided
the rising global merchants with access to justice through a transnational and
reliable dispute resolution mechanism. It has been said that:
One of the most novel and exciting elements of the recent advent of
international investment arbitration is that international law has
become accessible in a manner never before available to investors. As
international law has traditionally been a state-to-state activity,
espousal of the claims of nationals by states was previously the only
means by which an individual or legal person could receive some form
of international justice. The foundation principle of international law
has been that states, and not private parties, or individuals, are the
57

KAJ HOBÉR, SELECTED WRITINGS ON INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 17 (2013).
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 339-40 (2017)
[hereinafter CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW] .
59 Carbonneau, supra note 19, at 66.
58
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subject of international law. International investment instruments,
such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the ICSID
Convention, have effectively turned this fundamental element of
international law on its head.60

However, “sovereignty nonetheless remains an obdurate obstacle to
adjudicatory civilization.”61 The backlash against ISDS seems to start and
end here.62 What is forgotten in the debate is that states have renounced
elements of their sovereignty for economic gain and following careful
political considerations; in other words, there is a quid pro quo where
sovereignty gives in for the need to attract FDI.63
Moreover, as explained by Chief Justice Menon, the evolution of ISDS
was “[i]n keeping with the postwar abhorrence of war and the use of force,
states moved away from ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in economic relations, seeking
instead multilateral international agreements for the protection of the private
rights of their nationals”.64 This was true then and is true now. Investors no
longer have to rely on diplomatic protection or state-to-state arbitration and
gunboat diplomacy is put to rest as an ancient bad practice.65 In fact, because
ISDS limits political discretion and avoids internal political dispute methods,
it works to promote the rule of law.66
60 Alan S. Alexandroff & Ian A. Laird, Compliance and Enforcement, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1172 (2008). See also Aron Broches, The
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 198 (1995) (“From the legal point of view the most striking
feature of the [ICSID] Convention is that it firmly establishes the capacity of a private
individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a state in an international forum, thus
contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a subject of international law.”).
61 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The U.S. Law of Arbitration: From 1925 to 2019, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2019) http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/11/17/the-u-slaw-of-arbitration-from-1925-to-2019/?print=print; See also Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 4
(“[R]adical critics see it as a ‘Trojan horse’ enhancing the power of US companies at the
expense of national sovereignty and interests.”).
62 See more on the backlash against ISDS in Part IV.
63 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 20 (“In an investment treaty, the host state
deliberately renounces an element of its sovereignty in return for a certain new opportunity:
the chance to better attract new foreign investments which it would not have acquired in the
absence of a treaty. It is true that this quid pro quo underlying the policy choice on the part of
the host state is based on a policy judgment the nature of which escapes precise evaluation. It
is based upon assumptions about the effect of the treaty which are objectively uncertain.”).
64 Menon, supra note 12, at 28.
65 Recently we have seen a disturbing folding of events in Libya that calls this assumption
into question. See Part III.B.
66 Menon, supra note 12, at 29 (referring to Charles Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s
in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 757 (2014). See also Schill,
Reforming, supra note 3, at 1 (“Recourse to international arbitration has been celebrated as
depoliticizing investment disputes and contributing to enhancing the rule of law in investorstate relations.”).
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I would add that ISDS furthers public accountability and therefore
contributes to a heightened democratic standing. Finally, IIAs protect the
intrinsic human right of owning property without arbitrary interference of
such. We should embrace post-WWII and Cold War virtues of liberal
capitalism and move on from utopian ideals to once again increase the
currency of practical experience.
B. Calvo Doctrine 2.0
Prior to the emergence of the Calvo doctrine, the international
community had achieved consensus on domestic protection schemes; these
were meant to sufficiently guarantee protection to foreign investors.67
However, the idea of preferential treatment in exchange for an inflow of FDI
was not praised by all. The now infamous “Calvo Doctrine” was first
published in 1868 by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo in which he “for the
first time presented a new perspective of this paradigm and asserted that the
international rule should in effect be understood as allowing the host state to
reduce the protection of alien property whilst also reducing the guarantees
for property held by nationals.”68 Additionally, the Calvo doctrine was based
on the view that foreign investors should remedy any grievances in national
courts and that there should be no access to international tribunals nor
diplomatic protection.69 The central ethos of the Calvo doctrine is (a) the
removal of IIAs, and (b) no ISDS procedures available for foreign investors.
Not so surprisingly, the ethos of the doctrine was revived “in a dramatic
fashion after the Russian revolution in 1917.”70 It then faded again together
with the reception of liberal democratic values and the endorsing of a free
and open market system. For some time, ideas that transcended socialism,
nationalism, protectionism, parochialism, and idiosyncrasy were strenuously
praised, and any alternative was emphatically debunked and rejected. Then,
again, there was a call for “New International Economic Order” that was to
inter alia get rid of rules protecting property by international law.71 This
phase lasted from the mid 1970s until around 1990 when it “became clear
that, together with the end of the Soviet Union, the Socialist view of property
had collapsed and that the call for economic independence had brought a
major financial crisis, rather than more welfare upon the people of [at that
time] Latin America.”72 As a result, these states “started to conclude [BITs]
the spirit of which was at odds Calvo doctrine, and the annual calls for
‘Permanent Sovereignty’ in the UN General Assembly came to an end.”73
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 496.
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 5.
Id.
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The now debunked and rejected Calvo doctrine was actually developed
“against the background of gunboat diplomacy” and “other practices through
which [Western] countries imposed their view of international law on foreign
governments.”74 Similar criticism is today leveled against capital-exporting
states and labeled a new form of hegemony. Critics make the point that IIAs
and ISDS are tilted too much in favor of foreign investors and undercut public
interest and sovereign prerogatives. Some criticism deserves attention and
should be assessed and addressed properly in light of a post-decolonization
landscape.75 This doctrine—and hence the justification for it—faded away
by intensified multilateral cooperation and economic interdependence
through cross-border cooperation.76
Today, in the 21st century, the pendulum is swinging back, and we are
witnessing the toxic and cyclical ethos of the Calvo doctrine reemerge.
Again, the doctrine makes its proponents believe in misinformed sovereigncentered “virtues” that have—as described above—never stood the test of
time. For example, in Latin America, we now see a reemerging turmoil,
including redefining IIAs, total withdrawal of IIAs, as well as abandonment
of the ISDS regime altogether.77 Critics strenuously argue that there is a
fallacy that ISDS positively impact investment flows and focus instead on
their perceived fact that host states “see these clauses as an obstacle to
environmental and social policies that will be challenged in front of
arbitrators rather than courts.”78
It is argued that the ethos of the Calvo doctrine is underpinned by a
“Marxist analysis of international law and [that this mental representation]
views international investment law as an attempt by developed countries to
impose their power on weaker, developing countries.”79 This backlash from
a minority of countries should better be understood as a result of their internal
74

Id. at 2.
In addition to serious reform proposals, such as increased transparency or ethical
standards, look at the work by TWAIL scholars and voices from the Global South. See, e.g.,
“International Law and the Global South – Perspectives from the Rest of the World”; e.g.,
Rumana Islam, The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) Standard in International Investment
Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL
LAW
AND
THE
GLOBAL
SOUTH (2018);
Leïla
Choukroune, Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law Sovereignty
Modern, the Law and the Economics, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1–8
(2016). However, much of this criticism is also cyclical and there was already in the 1970s a
call for a “New International Economic Order” that would inter alia get rid of rules protecting
against expropriation.
76 See, e.g. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 2 (“In 1907, the Drago-Porter
Convention was adopted to prevent the use of force for the collection of debt, and Calvo’s
radical attack on the protection of foreign citizens lost some of its justification.”).
77 For example, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID
Convention. Some states have withdrawn from many IIAs or all of them, e.g., South Africa,
India, Venezuela, Indonesia, etc. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5, at 46.
78 Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1086.
79 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 474.
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political situation rather than a lack of legitimacy of IIAs and ISDS.80 The
unsubstantiated sentiments of the architects behind the “New International
Economic Order” may once again be emerging, but this time the Marxist
analysis is accompanied by the power of state capitalism (most
predominantly China but also the capital-exporting Gulf States and other
BRICS countries). It is not an easy task to attack the critics’ analysis on
economic grounds alone. Thus, we must now add and emphatically
underscore philosophical preferences and the gravamen of liberal capitalism.
Additionally, one recent turn of events should cause a great deal of
concern in the international law community, namely, Turkey’s military
engagement in Libya (see below). The critics—i.e., social engineers with
neo-Marxism policy objectives—are now paving the way for a “legitimacy
war” on ISDS. They coin the battle of ideas as “a time of backlash.” Once
again, critics and ideologues are making the case that there is a deficit in
equality because domestic investors are not treated in the same manner as
foreign investors.81 The Calvo doctrine seems to have reemerged as a serious
lens through which to analyze IIAs and ISDS.
C. Turkey and Libya: Full Protection and Security or (Gunboat)
Diplomacy?
Several ISDS procedures have been brought against Libya following its
two civil wars. Hundreds of infrastructure projects were initiated in Libya, a
large portion of which came from the Turkish construction industry.82 More
specifically, in February 2011, “there were an estimated 100 construction
firms from Turkey operating in Libya, with over 270 unfinished projects
worth an estimated 28 billion US dollars (USD).”83 In the first civil war,
many Turkish investments were suspended. However, some projects were
reinitiated subsequent to the first civil war when the newly formed
government gave signals of economic and political recovery (between 2012
and 2014); this temporary improvement took yet another turn with the second
civil war (triggered on May 16, 2014).84 As a result, in the aftermath of
Libya’s failure to offer inter alia full protection and security, many investors
80

Id. at 496.
Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 3 (“ISDS also poses a problem for the principle of
equality, which is part of the democratic principle, because it only grants standing to foreign
investors, while denying access to domestic investors who are limited to accessing domestic
courts.”).
82 See Ana Maria Daza-Clark & Daniel Behn, Between War and Peace: Intermittent
Armed Conflict and Investment Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 43, 47 (2019).
See also footnote 11 listing some major Turkish construction firms with large infrastructure
projects in Libya, e.g., “some of the major Turkish construction firms with large projects in
Libya include: Güriş İnşaat, Rönesans İnşaat, Summa İnşaat, Cengiz İnşaat, Enka İnşaat,
Tekfen İnşaat, Ustay İnşaat, TAV İnşaat, Ertak İnşaat, and Nurol İnşaat.”
83 Id.
84 Id. at 48.
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turned to ISDS in order to remedy their grievances.85
Very recently, things have taken an unexpected turn; that is, Turkey
decided to support the internationally-backed Libyan government through
military support—and has even promised engagement if necessary.86 Apart
from any possible political stand-off or geopolitical positioning, it has been
described by Turkish officials as an aim “to salvage billions of dollars of
business contracts thrown into limbo by the conflict and secure more leverage
in the scramble for oil and gas in the Mediterranean.”87 Turkish officials
suggest the main goal is to ensure that the construction projects will
eventually be resumed—the projects are worth approximately $18 billion.88
Turkish companies have, for example, abandoned equipment such as
bulldozers and cranes. There are plenty of costly construction projects to be
resumed—including hospitals, shopping malls, and five-star hotels.89
If Turkey did indeed deploy troops in Libya to secure a favorable
investment climate for its many investors or to recoup lost profits through
diplomatic pressure, Turkey may have turned the tides on the evolution of
international investment law and ISDS by re-inviting a new era of gunboat
diplomacy or informal diplomatic protection. This could be one of many
manifestations of the unintended consequences of the contemporary,
misinformed backlash debate.90 These turn-outs must be monitored carefully,
and IIA protection through ISDS procedures should be strenuously praised
as a great invention in legal civilization. IIAs with ISDS clauses depoliticize
investment disputes and establish a favorable jurisdiction for FDI.
IV. DOES ISDS HAVE A FUTURE?
States have been inconsistent on matters of international trade and
85 Id. at 49 (“Thus, there are currently at least 11 pending treaty-based arbitrations under
four different IIAs that all relate to disputes that arose following the first Libyan Civil War.”).
See also footnote 23 listing the cases (Nurol İnşaat II v. Libya, ICC (2017), pending; Nurol
İnşaat I v. Libya, ICC (2017), discontinued; Ustay İnşaat v. Libya, ICC (2017), pending;
Tekfen İnşaat I v. Libya, ICC (2016), pending; Güriş İnşaat v. Libya, ICC (2016), pending;
Cengiz İnşaat v. Libya, ICC (2016), pending; Turkish Investor v. Libya, ICC (2016), pending;
Etrak v. Libya, ICC (2015), pending; South Korean Investor v. Libya, UNCITRAL (2016),
pending; German Investor v. Libya, ICC (2016), pending; DS Construction v. Libya, ICC
(2016), pending.). Additionally, there is a debate on whether there were two civil wars or one
continuing. It is a matter of controversy that I do not entertain here because it is outside the
scope of this paper.
86 Carlotta Gall, Erdogan Announces First Turkish Troops Are Heading to Libya, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/europe/erdogan-turkishtroops-libya.html.
87 Selcan Hacaoglu, In Battle for Tripoli, Turkey Has Billions in Projects at
Stake, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 8, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-07-08/in-battle-for-tripoli-turkey-has-billions-in-projects-at-stake.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Another is Latin American countries seeking to (a) redefine IIAs or withdrawal from
such, or (b) abandoning the ISDS regime altogether.
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investment—shifting between protectionism to extremely favorable
conditions. “These shifts in position often depend on how the internal
political climate of that country meshes with the world-wide economic
climate.”91 And at the moment “we are seeing more turmoil and dissonance
on trade than anytime since World War Two.”92 For example, recently, some
Latin American countries have again rebelled against IIAs and ISDS.93 Some
Latin American states have either refused to comply with the framework of
ISDS in general, or withdrawn from ICSID in particular, believing it to be a
source of Western oppression and economic imperialism.94 These states often
oppose IIAs or the interpretation of such.
For ISDS to fulfill its destiny and deliver on its promise, an exchange
between states must take place. States must refrain from invoking ancient
notions of “sovereignty” when acting in the international economic sphere.
States should unequivocally respect and honor consensual agreements to
arbitrate. Voluntary compliance is the norm for a rule of law and not an ad
hoc gesture of comity. Rogue actors should not be allowed to upset, disrupt,
or, worse, dismantle a transnational rule of law. However, the problems
looming in the horizon are far worse than isolated rogue states seeking to
circumvent compliance. European Union overreach and the surge in populist
and nationalist regimes combined with socialist-friendly movements have led
to a backlash to ISDS. In other words, the ITA “universe is not shielded from
the trend towards nationalism and protectionism currently sweeping many
parts of the world.”95 “It is in this politically, economically[,] and legally very
complex environment in which the current investment policy debate is taking
place in Europe.”96
We must underscore the workability and reasonable fairness and justice
91 WILLIAM F. FOX, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS AND ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE § 1.1 (6th ed. 2018).
92 Id.
93 See supra Part III.A.
94 See CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 58, at 340. For example, “Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Ecuador have withdrawn from ICSID or have reduced the scope of their consent
to ICSID arbitration.” Some states have withdrawn from many IIAs or all of them, e.g., South
Africa, India, Venezuela, Indonesia. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5, at 46.
95 KAJ HOBÉR & JOEL DAHLQUIST CULLBORG, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:
PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 14 (2018). See also CCIAG, supra note 10, at 2 (“However, given
increasing geopolitical volatility and the general perception of increased risks of cross-border
investment, global FDI flows have seen little growth over the last decade. […] In this
environment, it is more important than ever that states take steps to promote and facilitate
foreign investment. Among the most important of these is the development of stable and
transparent reinvestment regimes protected by access to effective ISDS mechanisms.
Numerous multilateral institutions have recognized that access to impartial third-party dispute
settlement is one of the key characteristics of a positive investment climate, along with such
factors as open competition, predictability, rule of law, lack of corruption, and stability. It is
one of the major factors considered by ratings and assessment mechanisms, including the
World Bank Group’s Ease of Doing Business Index.”).
96 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 41.
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delivered by the transnational regime of ISDS. Trust and confidence in
reasonableness must once again receive a heightened standing and increased
currency. ISDS has been a huge success, period. However, despite the
unparalleled success in adjudicating investor-state disputes, critical voices
have been loud in repeatedly demanding several reforms and, eventually, a
total transformation of the regime. These voices have primarily anchored
ISDS criticism in the fact that the respondents in ISDS procedures are always
states, and, therefore, there are external stakeholders to the procedure whose
interests should be taken into account. In the words of Professor Schill, the
ISDS community should perhaps move from considering legitimacy as a
“monodimensional concept” towards a “multidimensional concept of
legitimacy[.]”97 In this multidimensional representation of ISDS, the regime
takes into consideration “‘community legitimacy,’ ‘national legitimacy.’ and
‘global legitimacy’”; that is, not only—or primarily—focusing on “party
legitimacy.”98
With all due respect, before entertaining that debate, which is
meritorious per se, we should ask: why seek legitimacy through the lens of a
“mono-dimensional” conceptualization?99 And, if we do, how should we
understand each sub-area of legitimacy from a hierarchical point of view?
When we answer these questions, we then need to ask ourselves: why should
private parties be held accountable to one standard and states to another?
Should private enterprises arbitrating against each other also take into
account the effects and consequences on third parties (e.g., workers)? In other
words, should ICA also move towards a (re)conceptualization of its internal
and external legitimacy to account for stakeholders beyond the dyadic
structure of the private adjudicatory mechanism? With the logic of ISDS
critics, I can see no other answer than yes, unless the difference is justified
by the fact that one party is a sovereign state. And if that is the underlying
rationale, we have turned our back on years of legal evolution to make states
legally accountable when acting in a private capacity. At the end of the day,
if we start from the only serious premise that international arbitration is one
of the greatest achievements in legal civilization, then we should, as a
corollary, refuse to entertain any reform proposal that “would alter any of the
fundamental elements of international arbitration.”100
No matter the exact form ISDS is to have in the future; whether reforms
will be significant or modest; whether a total transformation is under way;
there is no denying that there has been a demand for the legal framework
among active cross-border investors. This is evidenced by the virtual
97

Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 117-22.
Id. at 119-22.
99 Id.
100 See Charles N. Brower, Michael Pulos & Charles B. Rosenberg, So Is There Anything
Really Wrong with International Arbitration As We Know It?, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 1, 7 (2013).
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explosion of ISDS in the last 15-20 years.101 The explosion is a direct result
of the investor’s desire for and trust in a neutral and workable dispute
settlement mechanism, on the one hand, and a host state’s desire to promote
and attract FDI, on the other.
Finally, and most importantly, it is argued that the critics of ISDS have
failed to appreciate the essential elements of arbitration.102 The premises of
the “backlash debate” are often flawed, half-cooked, and misinformed. As an
unfortunate result, there has been an unjustified move to reform the ISDS to
address these poorly-premised criticisms, which allegedly identify a deficit
of democracy,103 of the rule of law, and of human rights. As will be
demonstrated below, this criticism misses the purpose and objectives of ISDS
in favor of supposed adjudicatory virtues found in national court systems and
international judicial bodies—what critics indirectly consider to be legitimate
legal institutions. The truth is that ISDS furthers democracy, generally, and
the rule of law, in particular. ISDS is undemocratic only if democracy is
understood to mean political influence of host states in the regime.
Despite the criticism and “signs of a backlash, [ISDS] remains the best
available method for the protection of private investments from the acts of a
foreign host state.”104 Anyone that attacks ISDS must make a much more
compelling case than thus far presented. Most of the criticism has been
broadly sweeping and unsubstantiated. The fact is that “[a]rbitrators not only
achieve efficient and effective dispute settlement, but they also, through their
independent and impartial application of the governing law, foster the
international rule of law and an investment-friendly environment.”105
A. Backlash Against ISDS and the Quest for Legitimacy
The nature of transnational justice, in general, and of international
investment law and ISDS, in particular, is such that the distinction between
international and domestic law, on the one hand, and between public law and
private law, on the other, at times becomes blurred and hard to accommodate
101

HOBÉR & CULLBORG, supra note 95, at 9.
A caveat could be added here, namely, that the contemporary ISDS regime already
constitutes part of a quasi-institutional international arbitration order. These actors (essential
actors, service providers, and value providers) already engage in several rituals to make the
system perform and where necessary, reform. See Gaillard, Sociology, supra note 4, at 189
(“There is no doubt that the international arbitration world possesses all the key features of a
‘recognized area of institutional life’ with a constellation of actors performing various roles
and functions such as key suppliers, consumers, regulatory agents, and organizations, all of
which share a ‘common meaning system’ and interact more frequently with one another than
with other social agents.”).
103 Brower, supra note 16, at 286-87 (Critics are “[c]oncerned by the threat that it poses to
their political preferences, stakeholders have articulated narratives that portray investment
treaty arbitration as a menace to the public interest, to democracy, to sovereignty, and even to
the constitutional order in host states.”).
104 Menon, supra note 12, at 35.
105 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 497.
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in neat categories.106 That said, it is unequivocally the case that IIAs and
ISDS “do not cast the interest and benefits of the host state and of the investor
in an antithetic mode”; rather, the “motivation underlying such treaties [and
the nature of the ISDS procedure] assume that the parties share a joint
purpose.”107 Much of the backlash debate has been justified in half-cooked
criticism that cannot be verified, and, as a result, many of the reform
proposals lack fiscal rationale and sound commercial sense. Despite the
faulty reasoning behind the backlash, the consequences are real: countries are
leaving the ICSID system or the ISDS regime altogether.108
But before entertaining a backlash debate, one needs to conceptualize
“legitimacy” in the context of ISDS. At the outset, it should be said that
legitimacy is a concern for the defenders of ISDS as much as for the critics,
but their conceptualizations differ.109 A major concern with the contemporary
debate is that critics have been allowed to form their own conception of
legitimacy and then employ that conception as the “standard against which
to measure the acceptability of international arbitration.”110 As Professor
Schill rightly noted, “the concept of legitimacy is used pervasively in
international arbitration,” and he further added that “it animates the abstract
debates about the theory, philosophy, and idea of arbitration, and informs
practical, present-day controversies.”111 In this analysis, he rightly
underscores that the debate is anchored in the mental representation of
international arbitration. I use the definition adopted by Judge Brower and
Professor Schill in a paper published 2009 as a working definition; that is,
legitimacy is used to mean the “acceptance of ‘a rule or rule-making
institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has
come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process.’”112
Now to the debate. The vocal critics are not seeking to perfect the
interpretation of a clause in a particular IIA or to improve the procedural
integrity and efficiency of ISDS. Rather, their goal is to question the very
core features of international investment law and of international arbitration.
I argue that the “legitimacy crisis” is a subjectively-defined marketing
strategy that is aimed at capturing the narrative of the ISDS regime, in
106

See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 3.
Id. at 23.
108 Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 1 (“In reaction to [the legitimacy] concerns, ISDS
is facing a considerable backlash, including the retreat of some countries from the existing
system, the recalibration of substantive investment disciplines, and debates about ways to
reform it at the national, regional, and international levels.”).
109 Id. at 108.
110 Id. at 106.
111 Id. at 106.
112 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 471 (citing THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)).
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general, and at deciding on the premises of what makes it legitimate, in
particular.113 It calls to mind much about the infamous strategy of coining a
negative attribute to a serious contender, such as “lying Ted,” “crooked
Hilary,” “little Marco,” etc. It is inherently unfair, based on myths, and has
no basis in reality whatsoever. Though there may be room for improvement
or scope to discuss personal preferences or best practices, ISDS has no real
legitimacy crisis.
The inherently-subjective and perpetually-unresolved nature of the
legitimacy debate derives from a focus on how to respond to the legitimacy
criticism from selectively-chosen standards of justice, fairness, and
adherence to constitutional values. The primary focus should be trained on
ISDS as a mechanism to settle individual, private disputes. Professor Schill
is of the opinion that “[i]n order to remedy this shortcoming, a
multidimensional concept of legitimacy that encompasses not only ‘party
legitimacy’ but also ‘community legitimacy’,114 ‘national legitimacy’, and
‘global legitimacy’115 should be adopted.”116 Professor Schill wrote that:
All of these concerns ultimately involve the issue of whether
international arbitration as an institution exercises its transnational
authority in a way that can deliver fairness and justice for all
stakeholders involved, and hence is in line with the fundamental
values not only of disputing parties or the communities of users of
arbitration, but of society as a whole.117

113 I do not mean that there could be no measures from which to assess legitimacy. My
point is merely that there is no agreement on any such measures. See Schill, Conceptions,
supra note 3, at 108 (“Beyond the idea that legitimacy requires some sort of social acceptance
of the institution of international arbitration, of the procedures it follows, and the results it
produces, there is little agreement on what legitimacy actually means and whose views on
legitimacy count.”).
114 “Community legitimacy” was described by Professor Schill as “also includ[ing]
questions of arbitrator independence and party equality, questions of fairness in arbitral
procedure, and reasoning of arbitral awards that is adequate in order for the users of arbitration
to build up normative expectations about the functioning of international arbitration.” Schill,
Conceptions, supra note 3, at 119. It would be hard to deny that the current ISDS regime
satisfies any reasonable demand for community legitimacy.
115 “Global legitimacy” was described by Professor Schill as “the conditions under which
arbitration is seen as legitimate from the perspective of global society and its interests. This
conception is broader than ‘community legitimacy’ because it refers to all actors worldwide,
whether users of arbitration or not, that are affected by international arbitration.” Schill,
Conceptions, supra note 3, at 121. For a very good account of the civil society participation
in ISDS, see FAROUK EL-HOSSENY, CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:
STATUS AND PROSPECTS (2018).
116 Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 109 (“Beyond the idea that legitimacy requires
some sort of social acceptance of the institution of international arbitration, of the procedures
it follows, and the results it produces, there is little agreement on what legitimacy actually
means and whose views on legitimacy count.”).
117 Id. at 112.
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The ISDS-reform debate should indeed include a thorough discussion
on constitutional values such as democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental
human rights.118 In fact, it already does, and ISDS has been reformed to
reflect such values in conjunction with—but without disturbing—the
underlying features of international arbitration. The current regime does
indeed take into account more aspects than party autonomy and any other
hallmark of international arbitration. Most jurisdictions validate international
arbitration through both multilateral treaties (e.g., the New York Convention
and the ICSID Convention) and domestic pro-arbitration legislation (often
modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law). In pro-arbitration jurisdictions,
national courts refrain from interfering in the procedure and generally do
enforce the arbitration agreement (at the front-end), refrain from intervening
unnecessarily (during the arbitration), and enforce the arbitral award (at the
back-end). The ISDS regime carefully considers party legitimacy,
community legitimacy, and national legitimacy. Thus, the critics of ISDS
will put an extra emphasis on global legitimacy. Another reason for critics’
focus on global legitimacy is that party, community, and national legitimacy
are more specific, and, as a result, an honest analysis and discussion can take
place. It is much easier to make sweeping allegations on the basis of “the
principle of legality and accountability governing the conduct of public
bodies,” on the one hand, and the global dimension (i.e., considering the
perspective of the global society and its interests) of ISDS, on the other.119
There must be a balancing exercise of workability and the illusion of
adjudicatory perfection. The idea of ISDS as a forum of global governance
would require a different constitution of its empires and a total transformation
in its architectural structure. ISDS is not an institution of global governance,
even though its outcomes may have a great impact on governance.120
More fundamentally, why should one accept the underlying premise
that ISDS should “deliver fairness and justice to all stakeholders involved”?
And if one does, which may be—and is according to the author—reasonable,
118 See id. at 1 (“Responses to this criticism, in turn, should be framed within the same
value system, that is, by reference to constitutional principles that are globally shared,
including principles of UN constitutional law and the concept of sustainable development.”).
It is true that the proponents of contemporary ISDS should explain why ISDS actually furthers
democracy, the rule of law, and public interests (e.g., human rights, labour standards, etc.
through economic development and the spread of ideas of open-market economics and liberal
democratic values). In fact, Professor Schill proposed that any reform proposal should consult
the principles of UN and be done through a comparative constitutional law methodology. This
would lead to a situation whereby the deficit of democratic input, rule of law, and the
protection for fundamental rights would be enhanced; Id. at 4.
119 Id. at 121.
120 E.g., challenges may involve public regulatory acts, relate to actions taken in times of
political turmoil, affect the actions taken vis-á-vis natural resources, impact policy vis-á-vis
the environment, touch upon taxation, fiscal regulation, procurement, etc. ISDS is not a forum
of global governance merely because the disputes “often occur in highly politicized contexts,
and can be seen as challenges to the normal operation of political processes of host states.”
Brower, supra note 16, at 277-78.
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why should the stakeholder be defined as broadly as by the critics? Why
should a supposed lack of consistency trump the value of party autonomy?
Why should the supposed lack of diversity trump the value of choosing your
own expert? Why are permanent judges that are appointed by politicians and
subject to re-election considered more impartial and independent than private
arbitrators who are subjected to a robust disclosure regime, as well as
pressure and scrutiny from their peers and the public?121
As illustrated, much can be said about the backlash in nuance, scope,
and degree. However, the crux of the debate is both the ideological notion of
“sovereignty” and spill-over sentiments from colonialism (i.e., hegemonical
skepticism, that IIAs and ISDS are new forms of colonialism through
maintaining market superiority).122 The backlash debate starts from false
premises of what ISDS should be and whom it should serve. The debate fails
to consider three fundamental features of the adjudicatory framework: (1) the
“balance between the disputing parties”; (2) the “balance between
consistency, correctness, and finality”; and (3) the “current system [of]
enforceable awards.”123
First, states are in a global competition for FDI and a “favorable”
121 Law is not the only means of regulating human behavior. Human behavior can also be
regulated by social norms, the market, and architectural design. Arbitrators are constrained by
rules of professional responsibility, but more so by public scrutiny, peer pressure, reputational
stake, market demands, the architectural design of the ISDS (e.g., by arbitral institutions in
the appointment procedure), etc. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 501 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
122 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 14 (“The period between 1945 and 1990
saw major confrontations between the growing number of newly independent developing
countries, on the one hand, and capital-exporting states, on the other, about the status of
customary law governing foreign investment. These were often prompted by ideological
positions, by an insistence on strict notions of sovereignty (“Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources”), and by the call for economic decolonialization, supported by an
economic doctrine calling for independence from centres of colonialism.”). See also Rudolph
Dolzer, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Decolonization, 7
HUM. RTS. L. J. 217 (1986). See also Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 113 (“The second
challenge relates to the issue of whether arbitration is able to deliver fairness to all participants
and is representative of the interests of all participants, or is a dispute settlement system
dominated by Northern and Western actors and ideology, which disregards interests and
values of developing and transitioning countries.”). Generally speaking, the critique that ISDS
is dominated by Western ideology is not wrong. It is a manifestation of both globalization and
the free and open market system. The crux of the matter is whether it is good or bad? One
should not too readily reject the success as hegemonical or one-sided. It does not disregard the
interest and values of developing and transitioning countries, but it may not yet resonate as
well with these countries. There may be a reason apart from hegemony and bullying as to why
some countries are considered developed and others are not. In fact, this debate is a bit
problematic in today’s environment as state-capitalism (e.g.. China and Saudi Arabia) has
been a fiscal success, just as liberal-capitalism has been for quite some time. Finally, see also
Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 1 (“[D]ifferent reform proposals often reflect different
(political, ideological, or institutional) preferences that may not be globally shared.”).
123 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 2-3.

303

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:273 (2021)

investment regime serves the purpose of attracting investors.124 Second, “the
system was not designed to produce absolute consistency.”125 This is very
important because the debate often culminates in a false quest for
adjudicatory perfection through aligning the ISDS regime with a loose and
undefined notion of the “rule of law” and misses the need for functionality
and workability. This is not to say that ISDS should not develop in accord
with a strong notion of the rule of law—it always has. It just means that the
performance of ISDS should first be defined and tested against the core
features of international arbitration. In addition, the half-hearted mission for
absolute consistency (which is impossible even with an appellate body)
would significantly increase time and costs of the proceedings. In fact, ISDS
furthers a global rule of law and manifests a new global legal order. Finally,
international arbitration has been the preferred means of settling investment
disputes partly because the enforcement of ISDS awards is a success story
compared to other means of dispute settlement—e.g., mediation or enforcing
foreign judgments.126
I close this section by quoting Gary Born from a now rather famous
panel speech he gave in 2016 where he addressed several clouds that are
lurking on the horizon and the critics’ actual world-view and justifications
for their critique:
The reality is that the critics of [ISDS] see it as a threat to their vision
of the rule of law. In fact, they do not want a rule of law, what they
want is state domination, just like the Napoleonic code, of all aspects
of private life. They do not really want a TTIP investment chapter at
all, they do not really want protections against expropriation, or
denials of justice, or denials of fair and equitable treatment. They want
states to be entirely free to do as they wish and take as they want. That
124

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
126 See, e.g., White & Case and Queen Mary School of International Arbitration, 2018
International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, (2018),
www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/2018-international-arbitration-survey-evolutioninternational-arbitration. There is no comparable multilateral instrument for the enforcement
of foreign judgments. However, for purposes of competition with arbitration, see the recent
product of the Hague Conference (Twenty-Second Session), Final Act (July 2, 2019), on
elaborating a treaty for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil or commercial
matters. See also the recent Singapore Mediation Convention, i.e., United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, United Nations Convention on International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (2019), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/
uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/EN/Texts/UNCITRAL/Arbitration/mediation_
convention_v1900316_eng.pdf. For a good remark of one of the more prominent practitioners
and scholars of international arbitration, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 73 (2d ed. 2009) (“While far from perfect, international arbitration is, rightly,
regarded as generally suffering fewer ills than litigation of international disputes in national
courts and as offering more workable opportunities for remedying or avoiding those ills which
do exist.”). Enforcing ISDS awards happens primarily pursuant to the enforcement regime
established by New York Convention or the ICSID Convention.
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is not the rule of law, it is the opposite. In 1933, the height of NaziGermany’s ascent to power, there was issued something called the
Reich guidelines on arbitral tribunals —those guidelines provided that
the institution of arbitration was a threat to the national socialist vision
of state order. Those guidelines counseled that the state and state
owned entities not conclude arbitration agreements because they
undermined the state’s ability to affect the rule of law in Nazi
Germany. That is the vision unintentionally that the critics of TTIP
embrace. That is not the vision that Germany accepted in the next 60
years, the Federal Supreme Court instead looked to the liberal
constitution that followed WWII in affirming the right of citizens to
arbitrate.127

Gary Born is right in his observation. The actual vision of the critics was
displayed in a report titled “Profiting From Injustice.” In that report, the
authors rhetorically ask whether anyone would “go to court with the devil if
the court was in hell?”128 With this mindset, it is hard to see how they would
genuinely seek to improve ISDS rather than to eliminate it altogether.
B. Reform Proposals
1. Radical Reform Proposals: Investment Court System or an Appellate
System?
In light of the supposed legitimacy deficit, two radical proposals have
been suggested, namely, the proposed Investment Court System (ICS) and
the call for an appellate mechanism.129 These proposals have gained much
traction since 2015, following the European Commission’s proposal to
substitute ISDS for an ICS in the European Union’s investment chapters in
future Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The ICS-proposal seeks to set up a
permanent tribunal with an appellate body and permanent judges. Both
proposals represent a systematic reform and have been held out as options
that:
[W]ould bring ISDS more in line with constitutional principles. Both
an appellate mechanism and a permanent investment court would
serve the rule of law by introducing an additional instance that could
ensure the correctness of decisions rendered in ISDS. Both an
appellate mechanism and a permanent investment court would also
increase coherence in ISDS and contribute to the emergence of a
jurisprudence constante (a consistent and stable jurisprudence). This
127

Born, supra note 1.
PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS,
ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 11 (2012).
See also Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5, at 46.
129 For a very good outline of the idea of an ICS or an Appellate Body, see Bungenberg &
Reinisch, supra note 11.
128

305

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:273 (2021)

would reduce uncertainty in decisionmaking and increase
predictability and legal certainty for both investors and host
governments.130

On the other hand, it has been opined that these proposals “are
fundamentally contrary to the interests of both states and investors” and that
such reforms “would significantly undermine investor confidence and reduce
global investment flows.”131 The CCIAG listed five “flaws that cannot be
remedied with technical solutions,” namely:
The [ICS] is flawed because it: (1) tilts the balance of the dispute
settlement system against investors, who will change their investment
decisions accordingly; (2) eliminates party autonomy for both
investors and respondent states in the selection of arbitrators; (3)
reduces the pool of qualified arbitrators; (4) introduces uncertainty
regarding the enforceability of arbitral awards; and (5) introduces
uncertainty regarding how dispute settlement proceedings will be
funded and maintained over time.132

An ICS regime had for long been met with contempt. It was not until
recently, when the European Union proposed it as a serious alternative to
ISDS, that it picked up steam.133 This proposal, except for being radical ipso
facto, underscores yet another concern among freedom loving European
citizens, namely, EU overreach. The European Union has institutionalized
almost every aspect of social life in Europe, and this ICS-proposal can be
traced back to the European Union yet again, cloaking itself as the centre for
solutions to all political concerns and policy objectives among its member
states. This proposal came shortly after the Lisbon Treaty, whereby the
European Commission began to develop a common investment policy.134 In
130 Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 8. In addition to strengthening the rule of law, it has
been argued that these proposals would enhance democracy. See id. In addition, it has been
said that an ICS would lead to greater consistency of decisions; greater legitimacy;
independence and neutrality of judges; be more cost-efficient; enhance access for small and
medium enterprises; increase transparency; and be more time efficient. See Bungenberg &
Reinisch, supra note 11, at 16-20.
131 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 1.
132 Id. at 5.
133 Following EU having developed a common investment and trade policy initiative, the
commission has proposed the ICS in investment chapters in new Free Trade Agreements
(FTA). See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), the EU-Singapore and
EU-Vietnam bilateral agreements, and the newly released Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement with Canada (“CETA 2016”).
134 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INVESTMENT (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
accessing-markets/investment/. For good discussions on its consequences, see inter alia Gallo
& Nicola, supra note 5; Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Geopoliticization of
European Trade and Investment Policy, 57 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 103 (2019); Ondrej
Svoboda, The Common Commercial Policy after Opinion 2/15: No Simple Way to Make Life
Easier for Free Trade Agreements in the EU, 15 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL’Y 189 (2019).;
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this new role of negotiating and concluding new IIAs, the European Union
has levelled serious critique against ISDS and proposed instead the ICS.
Thus, the ICS may be a symptom rather than a disease.
What the European Union fundamentally fails to see and willfully
ignores is that “[m]ost EU Member States and the [United States] are in
favour of including this type of dispute resolution mechanism as they
consider that ISDS will encourage investment flows.”135 Serious concerns
have also been raised vis-á-vis an appellate mechanism. CCIAG argued that:
The appellate mechanism is flawed because it: (1) tilts the balance of
the dispute settlement system against investors in the same manner as
the MIC [multilateral investment court]; (2) makes erroneous
decisions permanent; and (3) increases the cost and duration of
proceedings.136

One does not have to agree with all three points. The appellate proposal
is significantly different and to be distinguished from the more radical ICS
proposal. For example, one can argue in response, as Chief Justice Menon
has done, that “an increasing number of major and complex commercial
cases are heard by arbitral tribunals rather than by municipal appellate
courts” and that “this threatens to hinder the development of a coherent
freestanding body of substantive international commercial law, and over
time, this must add to the cost of transnational trade.”137 However, it is
demonstrative of valid counter-arguments. It is argued that the establishment
of an appellate mechanism should be refused due to inter alia the tilting of
balance between the parties and the interference with the fundamental
element of finality. This culminates essentially in a policy preference for the
traditional one-bite at the apple arbitration over a permanent or two-tier
system—unless the parties exercise party autonomy on an ad hoc basis to opt
for an alternative appellate tribunal. It should be mentioned that some
scholars are of the opinion that an appellate body does not sufficiently solve
the legitimacy deficit in the same manner as the proposed ICS.138
Finally, before venturing onto more reasonable reforms and debunking
some of the myths surrounding the contemporary criticism, we need to ask
ourselves: “[s]o is there anything really wrong with international arbitration
as we know it?”139 I argue that there is nothing wrong with contemporary
ISDS—quite to the contrary.

and Ondrej Svoboda & Jan Kunstyr, What Can We Expect from Post-Brexit United Kingdom’s
Investment Policy?, 9 CROATIAN Y.B. PUB. & PRIV. INT’L L. 352 (2018).
135 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 3.
136 CCIAG, supra note 10, at 11.
137 Menon, supra note 12, at 27.
138 See Bungenberg & Reinisch, supra note 11, at 21.
139 See Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100.
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2. Reasonable Reform Proposals: Furthering the Fundamental Elements of
International Arbitration
Apart from radical proposals rooted in ideology and manifested as a
supposed lack of legitimacy, there is good substance in the fact that ISDS is
no longer a dyadic dispute settlement mechanism only; ISDS has transformed
into a “stable institution of transnational governance.”140 That said, because
reform-proposals may affect not only global investments but the civil society
at large for many years to come, the ISDS-reform debates must “proceed in
a well-informed manner and take into account the interests of all stakeholders
in a balanced way.”141
Because ISDS was based on the same model as ICA, there are elements
that could be reformed to accommodate for the fact that the respondent is
always a host state. As mentioned already, some reform-proposals deserve
merit and attention; such as increased transparency, higher ethical standards
of arbitrators and counsels, increased arbitrator intelligence, amicus briefs,
appropriate consideration of human rights concerns, investor obligations in
IIAs,142 and joint committees to issue binding interpretations of IIA
standards.143 In addition, the establishment of an advisory center could be of
immense benefit for developing states as well as small- and medium-sized
investors.
But, if we bear in mind that ISDS is actually a form of arbitration and
that reform proposals are best considered with that in mind, this reform
debate should not focus too much on suggestions to institutionalize the
regime in order to supposedly elevate its standing to a so-called legitimate
body of global governance. Judge Charles N. Brower, Michael Pulos, and
Charles B. Rosenberg made a perfect point in that:
[A]ny proposal that would alter any of the fundamental elements of
international arbitration constitutes an unacceptable assault on the
very institution of international arbitration. Conversely, any proposal
that does not attack those fundamental elements, but instead is
140

Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 110.
Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 1.
142 This critique has been frequently ventilated, and some countries have started amending
their BITs to take into account investor obligations (e.g., India). See Gallo & Nicola, supra
note 5, at 1149 (“While foreign investors have access to international investment courts
against the host State when it is in violation of environmental, human rights, labor, or corporate
social responsibility norms affecting local communities, indigenous people and workers have
limited remedies against these tortious actions by foreign investors.”).
143 Such committees already exist in MITs, and most BITs have some form of a clause to
remedy a difference of understanding in interpretation between the states. However, states
should not be allowed to interpret the text of the treaty ex post facto or post hoc. Such an
approach would undercut the essence of the VCLT, in general, and Articles 31 and 32, in
particular. Post hoc interpretative statements would disrupt the arbitrator’s independence and
impartiality to rule on the matter before them in accordance with the rule of law textually
perceived on the day or at the sequence of time that the alleged breach occurred.
141
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designed to enhance them, should be considered carefully and may be
found to be an improvement of it.144

As a corollary, we should strengthen the fundamental elements of
international arbitration. We could, for example, discuss expedited
procedures for small- and medium-sized companies, additional case
management tools, a possible advisory center, a code of conduct, etc.145
International arbitration has always been amended to reflect business needs
and the concerns of civil society. To illustrate the willingness to reform, the
international arbitration community has welcomed inter alia the International
Bar Association rules on the taking of evidence in international arbitration,
the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, and the Hague rules on human rights
and arbitration.
C. Unsubstantiated Criticism and the Virtue of Truth
It should be mentioned and strenuously emphasized that much of the
contemporary criticism is misinformed and often outright false. Illustratively,
the European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA)
outlined why eleven of the main criticisms are one-sided and lacking in
nuance.146 I will briefly outline only three for demonstrative purposes;147
those are, (1) the “claim of a lack of transparency;” (2) the “claim that a small
elite group handles most arbitrations;”148 and (3) the “argument that ISDS
144

Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 7.
See, e.g. CCIAG, supra note 10, at 16-20.
146 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 4-42.
147 This list could have been much lengthier. For further illustrative purposes, see Brower
& Blanchard, supra note 5, at 50-58 (discussing several critiques and debunking each; for
example, that BITs favor rich Northern states by emphasizing the large number of intra-South
BITs; that there is no anti-State bias and that statistics firmly debunks that argument; that ISDS
does not unjustifiably interfere with democratically elected governments or “sovereignty” but
that there is an exchange for benefits whereby a sovereign binds itself to treat foreign investors
in accordance with the rule of law; and that the assumption of a “regulatory chill” is blown
out of proportion and is mostly hypothetical and that in fact investment law has grown to
provide host states with broad deference to their public concerns.) and Brower & Schill, supra
note 23, at 474. (debunking inter alia the pro-investor bias argument, i.e., that investors do not
at all come out as huge winners in the vast majority of ISDS dispute).
148 Furthermore, it is argued that state appointed permanent judges would make the
investment regime more democratic. See Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 8 (“Finally, an
appellate mechanism, as well as a permanent investment court, would allow controlling lawmaking activities in ISDS and thereby make the international investment regime more
democratic. This is particularly the case if members of the respective mechanisms are
appointed by participating states in democratic processes, which are modeled, for instance, on
how judges of other international courts are selected.”). I fundamentally reject this position. It
is actually the opposite. It undercuts the bedrock principle that makes the institution of
international arbitration internally democratic, namely, party autonomy. Moreover, at its core,
this argument stems from the critique on the impartiality and independence of arbitrators. The
current ad-hoc appointment is considered to lead to a pro-investor bias. This critique, too, is
unsubstantiated, and there is no evidence to show that the current disclosure regime and the
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leads to so-called ‘regulatory chill.’”149
First, “the truth is that the majority of arbitral proceedings take place
under ICSID rules and ICISD awards have been published on the ICSID
website for several years (and the new UNCITRAL Transparency Rules
introduce the same level of transparency for UNCITRAL proceedings).”150
Transparency in ISDS procedures has already occupied a central part of the
reform debate and has to a large extent, been remedied with success. This
reform is manifested in the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, the 2006 ICISD Amendments, and
the increased currency and standing of amicus curiae in ISDS procedures
with an alleged public policy concern.151 EFILA summarized this position
well as follows:
Over the past decade, the investment arbitration community and
States have continuously sought to implement a wide range of
effective tools that supports its legitimacy as a system of investment
global governance, where transparency has been a key tool for the
accountability of investment arbitration.
[…]
The reality is that the system has never been so transparent and the
criticism that there is a lack of transparency in ISDS is not supported
by the developments and improvements of the past decade.152

This reform proves that the ISDS regime continuously reforms to take
into account the global dimension of the overall quest for legitimacy.
Allowing public interest groups to participate in ISDS proceedings
strengthens the constitutional value of democracy. In this light, one could
highlight that a similar evolution is possible to remedy the concern of
shielding human rights violations. Much in the same manner as the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules have been developed and adopted, the
Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration has been adopted to
reflect this concern.153 Yet again, the ISDS community is showing great
reputation stake (among other things) has not protected the regime against impartial or
independent arbitrators.
149 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 4-5.
150 Id. at 4.
151 The 2006 ICSID Amendments “make non-dispute parties able to intervene in
arbitration proceedings and attend hearings. The new rules also promote disclosure of ICSID
awards. The participation of third non-disputing parties has incorporated into ISDS a different
way of promoting transparency by means of public interest participation […]”. Id. at 15. See
also CAFTA and NAFTA provisions on amici participation.
152 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 17.
153 The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration Team, Dec. 12, 2019,
https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The-Hague-Rules-on-Business-andHuman-Rights-Arbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf. See also Ylli Dautaj, Roll Out the Red
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willingness to consider legitimate proposals to enhance the national and
global legitimacy of the regime.
Second, “the truth is that arbitrators are appointed by States and
investors and thus states are entirely free to appoint other individuals thereby
widening the pool of arbitrators.”154 Arbitration is underpinned by party
autonomy. Party appointed arbitrators are one of its many expressions. Party
autonomy combined with flexibility allows parties to tailor their procedure
and to appoint an arbitrator of their choice. The fact that a small group of
individuals is “over-represented” is actually common sense in a field that
requires unique experience and expertise. A permanent institution would
narrow the potential field, and furthermore, “undermine the very foundations
of arbitration (and justice): the equality of arms between parties.”155 The fact
that parties appoint their arbitrator does, in fact, strengthen the legitimacy of
ISDS by ensuring “that the decision-making process is not perceived as
something wholly extraneous to the parties, but instead as a legitimate mode
of resolving disputes.”156 Moreover, states are completely free to choose
outside the pool of the “elite”. Party autonomy is the only concept that can
truly address inequality and combine it with the liberal democratic bedrock
concept of freedom. EFILA wrote as follows: “[i]f States indeed feel so
uncomfortable with the current pool of arbitrators, they are totally free to
expand that pool by selecting “new” individuals. In this way States can also
actively widen and improve the composition of the pool by selecting more
women and more non- Western individuals.”157
Another critique often launched in this respect is that “arbitrations
create friction with domestic constitutional law as arbitrators, who have little
democratic legitimacy, often operate in non-transparent proceedings and
produce increasing amounts of incoherent decisions.”158 Thus, it is said that
this pool of elite arbitrators undercuts constitutional values (see discussion
above, Part IV.A.
Thirdly, the truth is that “there is no evidence which would support such
a claim.”159 This theory is based on the false (or at least unverified) premise
that ISDS leads the legislative branch to a halt in legislating for the
betterment of the state in accordance with public concerns (e.g.
environmental, human rights, employment, etc.). In other words, the theory
goes that “[i]f you were to face significant liabilities if you took a particular
Carpet: The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights are Finally Here!, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Dec. 26, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/12/26/roll-out-thered-carpet-the-hague-rules-on-business-and-human-rights-arbitration-are-finally-here/.
154 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 5.
155 Id. at 23.
156 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 494.
157 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 23.
158 Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 114.
159 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 5.
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action, you are less likely to take that action.”160 Furthermore, it has been
held that structuring IIAs and ISDS procedures in ways that leave sufficient
policy space for host states to regulate in the public interest would improve
the democratic deficit and in turn increase the legitimacy of ISDS by aligning
the regime with constitutional values.161 However, as reliable studies have
shown, “all concluded ICSID cases up to 2014, 47% relate to executive or
administrative acts, such as permits and licenses, whereas only 9%, or 14
cases, relate to legislative acts”.162 EFILA noted that:
[D]escribing ISDS as a force that unduly restricts countries’
legislative branch in exercising its sovereign powers to regulate or that
unduly chills existing or proposed legislation has no basis in political
science or analysis of international (investment) law and ISDS
statistics. The fact that regulatory chill cannot be measured may help
those who support the theory when influencing public opinion.
However, in the scholarly or policy debate, this impossibility should
nullify the regulatory chill theory, as does the fact that the vast
majority of ISDS-cases are not brought on the basis of legislative acts,
but rather due to executive acts.163

One should not too readily accept these many one-sided, flawed, and
baseless premises, and thereby engage in the ISDS-reform debate by
legitimizing a half or non-contextualized truth. It is important that any reform
proposal is underpinned by facts and not based in unsubstantiated and
sweeping allegations. “The bottom line of this analysis is that most of the
criticisms are neither supported by the facts nor by the treaty practice and
case law.”164 There is a virtue in truth and “an examination of the actual
evidence on investment treaties and [ISDS] fails to reveal the threats and
harms that have been posited.”165 Quite the opposite, “the system has been
functioning satisfactorily and that it generally provides for adequate
resolution of investment disputes.”166

160

Id. at 28.
Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 4.
162 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 27 (referring to Prof. Dr. Tietje and Associate Prof. Dr.
Baetens and Ecorys Rotterdam, “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” [2014] Study prepared for the Minister
of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Netherlands).
163 Id. at 30; see also Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 483-89.
164 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 42.
165 Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5, at 58.
166 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 42.
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V. THE PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE WHAT, WHY, AND FOR WHOM
Having discussed the virtues of international arbitration167 and its role
in legal civilization,168 we moved on to the contemporary criticism and
reform proposals.169 The reader should understand that within the sociology
of international arbitration there are constant debates as to the mental
representation of the regime and its effect on various stakeholders. The
dominant theories on international arbitration have been to conceive the
system as either (a) rooted in domestic laws (and practices)170; (b) deriving
from an entirely private normative order; or (c) as a transnational legal
system.171 No matter which underlying theory one embraces, some
fundamental elements of ICA are shared by all, such as expertise; flexibility;
neutrality; finality; confidentiality; and procedural informality.172
The first conception of arbitration is the least appealing but is also the
one resonating best with critics of private adjudication. The inherent feature
of arbitration as a system of party autonomy, whereby arbitrators exercise
kompetenz-kompetenz and the judicial branch in turn exercises minimal
interference at the front-end, let alone at the back-end due to the transnational
enforcement mechanism in place (e.g., the NY Convention), makes this
mental representation of arbitration completely unsuitable to contemporary
practices, doctrinal development, and sensible arbitration theory. Moreover,
the arbitral procedure itself has changed as a result of both the complexity of
the subject-matter, but also as a result of trial lawyers partaking in the
procedure. Thus, many of the features of court litigation are currently integral
parts of many ICA procedures.173 Judicialization has the potential to make
the well-functioning system as slow, expensive, and inflexible as court
litigation. But this is a debate for another day.
Now we come to the debate for today; that is, whether ISDS should
assimilate the theory of ICA, and if so, which one? As a corollary, should
ISDS embrace the fundamental elements of international arbitration and if it
167

See Part II.
See Part III.
169 See Part IV.
170 See Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 116 (“Under this conception, the legitimacy
of international arbitration flows from the conformity of the functioning of international
arbitration with the governing national law or laws.”).
171 See
JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2014); GAILLARD, LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 4; Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 115-17; and WON KIDANE, THE
CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 63-89 (2017).
172 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 235 (1999).
173 See, e.g., Eric Bergsten, Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 289 (2006). We speak about judicialization as either (or both) (a) the procedural
intricacies and formalities of “ordinary” litigation in the U.S., or/and (b) judicial intervention
and interference prior to, during, or post the arbitral procedure.
168
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curtails some, how many could it reject without undercutting what made it
one of the greatest achievements in legal civilization?174
We can start with the corollary, which results in an emphatic “yes”; the
fundamental elements of international arbitration should be embraced
wholeheartedly. Apart from confidentiality, which could be eroded
somewhat due to the global community at large, the elements of finality,
neutrality, and expertise should be strenuously praised.
ISDS procedures that are not “ICSID arbitrations” may be quite
different and more akin to large-scale ICA disputes. However, ICSID
arbitration represents a perfect balance in having evolved to take into account
for the global community at large, while maintaining a clear arbitration-like
mandate. In fact, the underlying theory of ISDS can allow for some
“judicialization” in order to satisfy the “sovereignty” element and the “global
community at large” (e.g., increased transparency), but it can only do so by
an informed exchange; that is, offer increased procedural intricacies in
exchange for a lessened judicial intervention/interference by national courts.
This is exactly what the ICISD regime provides for. Thus, the underlying
theory of ICSID ISDS is a mixture of deriving from a private normative order
and working as a manifestation of a transnational legal order (especially since
the substantive matters—and procedural features—evolve through arbitral
case law). The ICSID has its conceptualisation based on three prongs, all of
which are part of its mandate and founding document: (1) the first is
providing private parties and corporations direct access to states for dispute
settlement in an international tribunal; (2) giving recognition to the
agreements between a state and private parties or corporations as legitimate
international undertakings; and (3) the availability of an international forum
with its own arbitrators and rules giving it a separate existence than all the
existing machinery.175
Thus, ISDS should be (and thanks to ICSID is) grounded and regulated
in an international legal order (an arbitral legal order) that “remain[s]
detached from the municipal legal system.”176 The “ICSID Convention is a
self-contained regime detached from any municipal legal systems and with a
robust framework for its operation.”177 Conclusively, the contemporary
ISDS-ICSID regime is a national legal order that is detached from municipal
laws (apart from fact-finding) and municipal court intervention/interference.
174 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES
ARBITRATION (6th ed. 2018). (“In order to survive, legal civilization must transfer its mandate
to a process that abjures, to some degree, the fundamental values that define the legal
system.”).
175 Sergio Puig, No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
235, 242 (2014).
176 ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 107 (2009).
177 Ylli Dautaj, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against States and Defence of Sovereign
Immunity from Execution, MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 402 (2019).
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In the context of this paper on the legitimacy and future of ISDS, this
brief awareness of the theory underpinning international arbitration—ICA
and ISDS/ITA—and its fundamental elements (which are equally shared by
all mental representations) is important for mainly two reasons because (1)
the social actors of international arbitration always seek ways to improve the
system without disturbing its equilibrium state (whatever mental
representation they subscribe to), and (2) in determining which social actors
of international arbitration should be given “superiority” (or a higher claim)
in either pursuing the necessary legitimacy of the regime or in assessing a
particular reform proposal—is it the essential actors;178 the service
providers;179 the value providers;180 or the global community at large? The
latter reason may seem controversial to some, but the fact of the matter is that
not everyone should be given the same voice in these reform-discussions.
Nowhere in the sociology of human beings do we treat everyone as having
the same stake all the time. Put simply, not everyone has skin in the game
nor a dog in the fight.
Adopting the ICS would disturb the underlying theory of international
arbitration—both ICA and ITA. Thus, the ultimate question for ISDS is just
how much it could move away from its equilibrium state in order to take into
account concerns beyond its dyadic dispute settlement function. Put slightly
differently, should ISDS seek legitimacy in factors extraneous to its
traditional features of neutrality, party autonomy, reasonable fairness,
finality, enforceability, etc.? If yes, how much and when has the practice
amplified so much that it is a mere shadow of its equilibrium state? As we
engage in a debate on the evolution of ISDS, criticism, and reform-proposals,
we should bear in mind the role of ISDS in legal civilization and its
philosophical underpinnings.181 There must always be a balance and the
features should never move too far from a workable mental representation of
international arbitration as grounded in its fundamental elements.
Moreover, having discussed monodimensional approaches to analyzing
legitimacy,182 we should assess whether all providers should be given an
equal stake in reforming the regime. The backlash debate is misinformed
because its premises and assumptions are flawed; the debate is unjustifiably
one-sided. First, much of the debate is based on the fundamentally flawed or
even false assumption that “party legitimacy,” “community legitimacy,”
178 The essential actors are the parties and the arbitrators. See Gaillard, Sociology, supra
note 4, at 189.
179 The service providers are primarily the arbitral institutions, but can also include expert
witnesses, arbitration reporters, publishers, third-party funders, etc. See id. at 190-92.
180 The value providers are those actors that seek to “provide guidance as to the way in
which international arbitration should develop and arbitral social actors should behave” (e.g.,
the UNCTAD, UNCITRAL, OECD, other NGOs, IBA, academic institutions offering
arbitration-tailored teaching, etc.). Id. at 192-95.
181 See Part III and IV.
182 See Part IV.A.
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“national legitimacy,” or “global legitimacy” all should be treated on an
equal footing and that the former two cannot constitute the overall yardstick
for the legitimacy of international arbitration. I argue that this is not wrong
per se but definitely misconceived. It is argued that party and community
legitimacy should indeed be the overall yardstick for the legitimacy of
international arbitration, but that aspects of national and global legitimacy
should be carefully considered. In the sociology of arbitration, all
stakeholders have important roles to play, but there is indeed a hierarchy
between the actors. Put differently, the stakeholders should have different
voting rights in the ISDS articles of incorporation. For example, where a
proposal is presented and includes valid public interest considerations that
can improve the national or global dimension without interfering too much
with the private interests and the fundamental features of international
arbitration, such a reform proposal merits serious consideration. This is
nothing new; the contemporary ISDS regime has developed to take into
account the public interest without undercutting the fundamental elements of
international arbitration.
Second, the backlash debate is oftentimes based on yet another
misunderstood or misused assumption that “the international arbitration
system [is required] to open up towards outside perceptions and develop a
more sophisticated framework for thinking about its own legitimacy.”183 Not
being open to all forms of outside perceptions does not exclude taking into
consideration features that may improve and enhance the bedrock principles
of international arbitration. Input from non-actors or stakeholders lower in
the hierarchy is welcomed. However, “one cannot forget that arbitration is
intended for the parties and not for all the other actors that gravitate around
it[.]”184 If the regime is to take into account the global dimension as much as
the party and community dimensions, the regime must turn into a permanent
body that exercises global governance. This would indeed be in line with an
egalitarian approach to arbitration.
Third, the debate is often presented as a binary choice of two evils;185
that is, as an option between (a) “termination of [IIAs] and disengagement
from the ISDS system” or (b) “proposals involving a further
institutionalization of ISDS[.]”186 The first alternative defies the evolution of
international investment law and ISDS. It would place the ethos of the Calvo
doctrine and many other barriers at the forefront once again. But, the second
alternative is not at all in sync with the fundamental elements of international
arbitration, and therefore also constitutes an unacceptable assault on the
183

Schill, Conceptions, supra note 3, at 123.
Gaillard, Sociology, supra note 4, at 189.
185 To borrow language from an infamous critical report, why should investors choose one
of two options when both are held in hell? See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 128 (“Would
you go to court with the devil if the court was held in hell? Of course not. But governments
have done it hundreds of times. And continue to do so.”).
186 Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 6.
184
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institution of international arbitration.187 I strongly reject this false
dichotomy.188 Judge Brower’s approach has more nuance to it, namely, to
keep improving ISDS by enhancing the fundamental elements of
international arbitration.189 This approach has proven to take into account all
dimensions of legitimacy—party, community, national, as well as global.
In practice, the binary fallacy leads the reform debaters to conclude that
“a” system that protects investors is better than “no” such framework at all.
Having reached this reasonable conclusion, the reform debaters have
entertained another binary fallacy and are presented with yet another false
dichotomy; that is, that the legitimacy deficit can only be remedied by an ICS
or an appellate mechanism. Both are said to “have similar benefits in terms
of creating coherence and a better balance in ISDS jurisprudence[.]”190 Thus,
having gone through a series of false assumptions and misinformed premises,
the proponents of ISDS are presented with two alternatives whereby the
lesser of the two evils supposedly emerge as a “compromise[.]”191
Finally, all these assumptions and premises for ISDS-reform seem to
have accepted at the very outset that any reform should be “systematic” in
order to address the concerns of “ensuring policy space and reaffirming state
control over the system[.]”192 I argue instead that reform does not have to be
systematic, and it does definitely not have to assure state control over the
system. Quite the contrary, ISDS should level the playing field and should
guarantee equality of arms and party autonomy above all else.193 ISDS has
187

Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 7.
See Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 8, for a presentation of a binary choice in this
dichotomy (“While terminating IIAs and disengaging entirely from ISDS will not further
access to justice and efficient dispute settlement in investor-state relations, the existing arbitral
system needs fundamental reform to make it more democratic and bring it in line with the
demands stemming from the concept of the rule of law. Thus, to remedy the problem of
inconsistencies, a more centralized ISDS system is needed. This is only achievable through
increased institutionalization and the establishment of some centralized dispute settlement
body.”).
189 See Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 7.
190 Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 8.
191 Gallo, supra note 5, at 1086 (“The position of the Commission resulted in a
compromise between these two polar positions in its Report on the consultation on ISDS in
TTIP.”). The proposition here is that the ICS is a compromise between investors’ and some
host states’ perception; that is, “[m]any host governments see these clauses as an obstacle to
environmental and social policies that will be challenged in front of arbitrators rather than
courts” but that “investors favor ISDS clauses for fear that host governments will adopt
legislation in conflict with investment or trade treaty obligations[.]” Gallo, supra note 5, at
1086. This reasoning is flawed and misinformed. The ICS is not a compromise at all. It is a
proposal that undercuts the regime of ISDS altogether. A big concern of mine is that when a
radical idea is proposed (and especially when receiving traction in the civil society), the
proponents of the system tries to reach some form of consensus and may end-up giving in so
much too that risk the baby is thrown out with the bathwater.
192 See Schill, Reforming, supra note 3, at 1.
193 The host state can utilize its sovereign prerogatives if the investor negates its
undertakings and circumvents sticking to their original promise. As Judge Brower and
188
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not been an asymmetric legal regime that is unfairly detrimental to host states
in favor of investors. No statistical data can support such a claim.
In response to the supposed rigidity and unfairness of ISDS, reality tells
another story, namely, that about ISDS’s adaptability. Reforms have
considered and adopted not only the views of a close-knit community. The
type of institutional growth of ISDS has indeed been unique. It reflects the
stakeholder’s combination of “competitiveness, our inborn creativity, and the
proliferation of external indicia making our individual worth[.]”194 ISDS has
reformed so much that we today talk about ICA and ITA as two separate
regimes for transborder adjudication.195 Therefore, it is evident that the
critical social actors in the sociology of arbitration could neither integrate nor
assimilate to the ideology of international arbitration and therefore seek to
transform it. But a historical account of the regime supports the legitimacy
of ISDS—”it has been tested and accepted by states over centuries[.]”196
From the philosophical perspective, the main question we are left to deal
with is whether the supposed legitimacy crisis—which is motivated primarily
on a supposed systematic underperformance of ISDS as an institution that
exercises public governance—should trump the regime’s fundamental
features. ISDS has elaborated a workable doctrine on transnational dispute
settlement for the purposes of remedying grievances of an individual
character. Any reform proposal that undercuts the fundamental features of
international arbitration would move the regime farther from its equilibrium
state and eventually make the regime a mere shell of its former self.197
Professor Schill put it, the “host state does not depend on a dispute-settlement and compliance
mechanism to make the investor comply with its promises.” Brower & Schill, supra note 23,
at 482. At the outset the investor carefully must assess any risk to its investment, e.g., political
risk of future intervention, administrative consistency, tax protection, fluctuation in applicable
law, etc. However, “[o]nce these negotiations are concluded and the investor’s resources are
sunk into the project, the dynamics of influence and power tend to shift in favor of the host
state.” DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 4. Thus, it can properly be said that IIAs and
ISDS levels the level playing field between investors and host states.
194 See Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 2.
195 So much that there are independent university modules on each and master’s
programmes too. See, e.g., Master’s Programme in Investment Treaty Arbitration, UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET, https://www.uu.se/en/admissions/master/selma/program/?pKod=JIS2N (last
visited Mar. 14, 2021). Master of Laws (LL.M) (60 credits) in International Commercial
Arbitration, STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY, https://www.su.se/english/search-courses-andprogrammes/jiclm-1.411462 (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
196 Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 493.
197 The question is whether the regime can maintain its fundamental features and still give
enough attention to constitutional values to enhance its global legitimacy. See Schill,
Reforming, supra note 3, at 3 (“In sum, the current ISDS system conceptually suffers from a
tension between its public governance functions and its set-up as a private dispute settlement
mechanism that is modeled on how private-private disputes are settled in commercial
arbitration. Against this background, ISDS comes as a challenge to core constitutional law
values, such as the principle of democracy, the concept of the rule of law, and the protection
of fundamental or human rights.”).
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For the purposes of clarity, the proponents of ICS embrace a hierarchal
structure of legitimacy in ISDS. They favor external legitimacy over internal
legitimacy by emphasizing the global dimension. This may be because the
critics see the regime as having to perform its base and audience. We need
go no further than to quote the former European Commissioner for Trade,
Cecilia Malmström: she said that “[b]y making the system work like an
international court, these changes will ensure that citizens can trust it to
deliver fair and objective judgments[.]”198 This statement makes it
abundantly clear that the proposal seeks to eliminate any feature of
international arbitration and seeks to satisfy the legitimacy request primarily
vis-á-vis the global dimension.
VI. CONCLUSION
Logical and analytical reasoning underpinned—intentionally or
unintentionally—by a Marxist worldview has the potential to dismantle what
represents, with the benefit of hindsight, the greatest achievement in
humankind—that is, a workable economic, legal, and political order.199 This
is done in a streamlined, and often well-intentioned, aspiration to achieve
perfect harmony, unity, equality, and progress. The fairytale of outcome
equality guaranteed by the state and preserved in a “comrade hood” lives
on.200 This world-view overlooks facts; for example, that liberal democracies
198 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on
Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/cs/IP_16_399.
199 See Brower & Schill, supra note 23, at 474. Wars are mostly fought over competing
ideas, virtues, and values. According to me, the greatest threat to economic prosperity is the
so-called progressive, postmodernist movement that occupies much space in academia and in
other “intellectual” circles.
200 The reader might be of the opinion that this is an exaggeration and that the author is
making sweeping allegations in order to ventilate some of his overall political concerns and
policy fetishes. This is far from true. The backlash on ISDS and IIAs is political, indeed
ideological, and must be responded to in the same manner. The critique now, as in the era of
the Argentinian jurist Calvo, comes from a mental representation different from that rooted in
liberal capitalism. See, e.g., Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1148 (“In substance it remains to
be seen whether this new adjudication system transforms the practice and the outcomes of
international investment law in a more democratic and egalitarian direction.”). See also Lance
Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Negotiations: A US Perspective, 49 ECONOMIA & LAVORO 87, 88 (2015). This is exactly what
the critics desire, namely, to take make transnational cooperation more egalitarian. Most critics
do not put words on it, some do it unintentionally, and most do it from a morally sound
standpoint. However, that is neither here nor there. This mental representation of international
arbitration and transborder commerce, trade, and investment is outright dangerous to liberal
capitalism. For a more sound take on the matter, debunking the states’ utilitarian role and
focusing instead of de-politicization of investment disputes (i.e., measuring the success of
ISDS on practical experience rather than ideals), see Brower, supra note 16, at 318-19 (“In
fact, ‘depoliticization’ occurs only in the sense of removing controversies from the normal
political processes of host states and subjecting them to an international legal process, where
the decisionmakers lack direct political accountability, often have little direct experience with
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with free and open markets have elaborated a doctrine of cross-border
cooperation and municipal and global competition that transcends legal,
historical, philosophical, religious, political, and other barriers. It overlooks
the more reliable and functional idea of equal opportunity and individualism
that has allowed merchants to charter new territory and incidentally paved
the way for an interdependent, interconnected, and globalized world. In much
the same manner, the critics of ISDS overlook what actually works in
exchange for many naïve and utopian ideals.201 In this paper, I have
underscored that the ISDS universe is not shielded from the trend towards
socialism, nationalism, and protectionism currently sweeping many parts of
the world.202 To illustrate the view of critics, two authors highlighted what
they perceive to be ISDS’s shortcoming in redressing global inequities and
why they favor the investment court system. They write:
The ICS demonstrates that the Commission has challenged the status
quo of the traditional ISDS regime to institutionalize a permanent
tribunal. From a procedural perspective, we welcome this new
investment regime embodying the main criteria of public law
adjudication. Yet we question whether in substance the ICS is
equipped with necessary tools to engage with global inequalities,
sustainable devolvement, and human rights violations arising in the
current international investment regime in a transformative way.203

I urge the arbitration community to not too readily embrace a
supposedly good idea as a substitute for a workable one.204 The critics are
the social, political, and economic context for the underlying events, and have no mandate to
determine whether the challenged measures have produced beneficial outcomes for the
greatest number of people in host states”). See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5, at 46-47
(discussing the quote above, the authors write that “[s]uch opponents of investor-State
arbitration argue that investment arbitration is biased in favor of multinationals, either harms
or fails to benefit poor States, and interferes with the ability of democratic governments to
pursue policies in the public interest.”). Finally, see Enrique Alvarez, The Public International
Law Regime Governing International Investment, 344 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 452 (2011),
(describing that ISDS is meant to decide on whether the respondent state has “injured a single
foreign investor” and not whether the measures taken—for whatever reason—was “beneficial
to the greatest number”).
201 The critics emphasis a “transformative ideal” in the protection of the global community
at large. See, e.g., Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1148 (“In light of this transformative ideal,
the underlying political economy of the international investment treaty regime shows not only
the benefits in protecting foreign investors but also how the costs of pollution and labor
violations are easily shifted from the investors to the local communities of the host State.”).
202 HOBÉR & CULLBORG, supra note 95.
203 Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5, at 1090.
204 See Dautaj, supra note 151. This reasoning has in part been inspired by the work of
Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau and Judge Charles N. Brower, see, e.g., Brower, Pulos &
Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 13 (“Remember, however, that ‘change’ and ‘improvement’ are
not synonyms.”) and Thomas E. Carbonneau, Darkness and Light in the Shadows of
International Arbitral Adjudication, FACT-FINDING BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 95, 163 (R.
Lillich ed., 1991), reprinted as Chapter 5 in Carbonneau, supra note 19, at 158 (2011)
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close to orchestrating a hitjob on one of the greatest achievements in legal
civilization, namely, ISDS. In case they are successful, a global legal order
rooted in private ordering, freedom, and accountability will eventually—and
inevitably—turn into a dead and long-forgotten aspiration of global
intercourse.
The critics call for either (1) disengaging with IIAs, generally, and
ISDS, in particular, or (2) moving moderately to transform ISDS and reform
IIAs. Both lines of attack ultimately grow out of two re-emerging and
dangerous policy objectives and political concerns; that is, (a) the reemerging ethos of the Calvo doctrine, and (b) institutionalization of private
affairs, e.g., the European Union’s newly embraced common investment
policy that emphasizes primarily the political concerns and policy objectives
of EU bureaucrats and the “civil society” while rejecting party legitimacy.205
As a result of giving in to unjustified and unsubstantiated criticism, platforms
for multilateral cooperation “must take into account numerous interests and
satisfy divergent or even conflicting demands from parliaments, NGOs, trade
unions, business associations, etc.”206 Alarm bells are ringing and it is
important that these institutions must not forget the reason for their coming
about. Moreover, it is hoped that the European Union does not (ab)use the
vacuum created by Donald Trump’s global resistance to “focus on
negotiations with more pliable states, thereby establishing a critical mass of
treaties embracing the European Union’s vision and obligating the other
states’ parties to pursue the same vision in their own treaty practices, which
could shift global expectations about the prospects for an investment
court[.]”207 It is time for the immediate stakeholders to speak up.
The bottom line is this: we have already tried to centralize and
institutionalize private affairs at the mercy of the sovereign. A world where
the state was absolutely immune from private law consequences for private
acts was tried and international commerce, trade, and investment were
hindered as a consequence. We decided that states should not be able to do
as they wish and take as they want. Political, economic, philosophical, and
legal revolution—and evolution—took place. We should emphatically
embrace and align with political concerns and policy objectives of liberal
(“Integrating different adjudicatory values into the established ideology of arbitration could
impede or extinguish the viability of the process rather than adapt it to changing
circumstances. Tinkering with the tried and true, a workable and working process, is a
hazardous undertaking.”).
205 See, e.g., the argument of two proponents of the ICA proposal and EU’s new role: Gallo
& Nicola, supra note 5, at 1089 (“However, we argue that the transformative EU proposal
stems, above all, from internal constraints such as the need to safeguard the EU legal order
and to avoid jurisdictional clashes, as well as the need to reconcile the opposing notions of the
right to regulate for public interest, and the fair and equitable treatment of foreign
investments.”). For a good discussion on the role of the civil society in ITA, see EL-HOSSENY,
supra note 115.
206 Alvarez et al., supra note 3, at 41.
207 Brower, supra note 16, at 294.
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democracies that strenuously have elaborated and observed the concept of
individualism and the free and open market system. A rules-based
international legal order merits a heightened standing and increased currency
once more. A private ordering of business facilitates and promotes trust and
cooperation. This is not the time to cower down to ideologs, demagogues, or
moral grandstanders. As Gary Born eloquently noted, if Europe decides to
not follow the rest of the world in guaranteeing citizens the right to arbitrate,
we “would turn our back on the rest of the world and place ourselves behind
a wall”.208 As demonstrated by experience, the setback will prove temporary,
as the roots of the criticism are unsubstantiated and therefore remain at best
cyclical. However, the years of turbulence and damage would be
unnecessarily devastating. As with the Berlin wall, let’s hope that this
European wall does not last either.209 If the ICS wins traction, the invisible
college of the proletarian arbitration league has finally made its existence
visible.210 Thus, before the league gains further acceptance, the proponents
of the regime and the immediate actors and stakeholders in the sociology of
international arbitration better prepare to make their case loud and clear by
underscoring the standing of ISDS in legal civilization and the intrinsic
currency in its philosophical underpinnings.
At the end of the day, instead of writing this lengthy research paper on
why ISDS is the best venue for redressing grievances stemming from
investment disputes, one should simply have placed the burden on the critics
by asking the accusers to make their case beyond a reasonable doubt before
starting the assassination of a perfectly functional transnational adjudicatory
framework. But because the critics deal in ideology and bliss beliefs rather
than facts and virtue,211 we need to engage in this silly blame game in order
to expose the European Union’s naked Emperor to a blind and deaf audience
208 Born, supra note 1. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, nationalism and populism
is pushing for another, physical wall meant to divide rather than unite.
209 Born, supra note 1.
210 Gaillard, Sociology, supra note 4, at 194 (“The only clubs missing in arbitration are
those reflecting social class divides. The Proletarian Arbitration League has yet to be
created.”). Intentionally and often unintentionally, this creeping movement of ideologs have
been well-represented in academic settings, in politics, and in NGOs. In other words, they
make up for a large part of the “civil society” that seeks to enhance the global legitimacy of
ISDS. See, e.g., EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 128; Jean-Claude Juncker plays with future
of EU-US trade deal, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/3571c8b2-5ac011e4-b449-00144feab7de; B. Segol, TTIP Will Not Be Approved Unless ISDS Is Dropped,
FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 27, 2014); Alison Ross, Will Juncker junk ISDS?, GLOBAL ARB. REV. GAR (2014),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1033829/will-juncker-junk-isds;
Gallo & Nicola, supra note 5; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Interview with New York Times’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14
, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/14/opinion/elizabeth-warren-nytimesinterview.html (discussing ISDS negatively, comparing the regime with labour enforcement
provisions).
211 Brower, Pulos & Rosenberg, supra note 100.
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of ideologs.212 On the other hand, the European Union’s proposal even smells
bad.

212 See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN & VIRGINIA LEE BURTON, THE EMPEROR’S NEW
CLOTHES (1949).
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